Questions About the 4-4-2

During Manchester City's first match of the season, versus Swansea, the commentators were once again shouting their typical refrain: "Mancini needs to be more positive. He needs to play two up front. He needs to play 4-4-2!"

This annoyed me more than usual, though, because City clearly were playing more attacking football. They made 19 shots on goal in the first half alone. That they didn't score in the first half owed much to an incredible performance by Swansea's goalkeeper, Vorm, and more than a bit of luck.

This perplexed me as well because City were, at that moment, playing with only one holding midfielder, something that I at least associate with a 4-4-2.

This left me with some burning questions. What do they even mean by a 4-4-2? And why do they associate it so strongly with attacking football?

Below, I will do my best to try to answer these questions.

Is the 4-4-2 a more attacking formation than 4-2-3-1?

Clearly not. Just consider some of the other teams that play a 4-2-3-1:

• Arsenal: 72 goals, 2nd most goals in the EPL.
  
  
• Bayern Munich: 81 goals, top in the Bundesliga. They scored 14 more goals than Borussia Dortmund, the 2nd best scoring team (who also play 4-2-3-1, by the way).
  
  
• Real Madrid: 102 goals (!!), top in La Liga. They scored 7 more goals than Barcelona, the 2nd best scoring team.
  

These are all teams that play attacking football. Indeed, the criticism of both Arsenal and van Gaal's Bayern Munich has been that they are weak at the back. van Gaal's team was described as "recklessly" attacking. I suppose some might note Mourinho's penchant for defensive play, but Real Madrid demands an attacking team, and the statistics above speak for themselves.

What is the 4-4-2?

It's hard to come up with a precise definition of the 4-4-2. Indeed, coming up with precise definitions for even ordinary things is a lot more difficult than you might think. (What is a chair? It's something with four legs that you sit on. Ummm, that's also not a horse.)

Let me instead say that the 4-4-2 is a formation that often has with the following properties:

1. Two strikers playing in the center-forward position.
   
   
2. Two natural wingers. (As opposed to "inverted" wingers. A natural winger plays with his strong foot on the outside, which means he can hold the ball by the touchline and deliver crosses easily. An inverted winger plays with his strong foot on the inside, which means he can cut inside and shoot on goal easily.)
   
   
3. Only one holding midfielder.
   

Of course, a given 4-4-2 need not have all of these properties. But actually, it's not clear that the 4-4-2, as played by the top teams, has any of these properties.

Does any top team play a 4-4-2?

Of the top teams in the top 4 leagues, only two write 4-4-2 on their teamsheet: Manchester United and Liverpool. Let's consider how well these properties apply to their 4-4-2 formations.

1. Two center forwards ("two up front") is perhaps the most commonly associated feature of the 4-4-2. And yet, neither of these teams plays with two traditional center forwards.
   
   Manchester United's Wayne Rooney is often called a "false nine". He has long spent much of his time between the lines, rather than up against the central defenders, but last season, he was often seen dropping even deeper, adding creativity to the midfield. Indeed, against bigger teams, he would often drop into midfield in order top prevent United from being overrun in that area of the pitch.
   
   Liverpool's Luis Suarez is another non-traditional striker. Like Rooney, he drops deep, but Suarez also likes to move out wide, i.e., he likes to play everywhere except in the usual center-forward position.
   
   
2. Neither of these teams play with two natural wingers.
   
   Last weekend, Manchester United played Ashley Young as a natural winger but Nani (as usual) played inverted. Liverpool played Stewart Downing out side, but Jordan Henderson was moving inside.
   
   
3. Both of these teams have played with two holding midfielders.
   
   It may be the case that United have a general tendency to use one holding midfielder. (Indeed, this impression is the reason that 4-4-2 and "one holding" were associated in my mind.) However, United have used two holding midfielders against bigger teams. For example, they have played Carrick and Fletcher together.
   
   United have also played Carrick and Anderson together, as well as Carrick and Scholes. These are all players that have been used as holding midfielders in recent times. Indeed, United have a large group of midfielders — Carrick, Fletcher, Anderson, Gibson, Scholes — none of whom seem to be great attackers. (Of course, Scholes was in the past, but he was widely described as being a defensive midfielder last season.)
   
   Liverpool frequently played Lucas and Jay Spearing together against the bigger teams last season. Both are considered holding midfielders.
   

If Ferguson can play one center-forward, only one natural winger, two holding midfielders, and call it a 4-4-2, perhaps Mancini should write 4-4-2 on his teamsheet and play his usual formation just to get the commentators off his back.

Again, what is the 4-4-2?

Based on the discussion above, one might be be tempted to take a weaker definition of the 4-4-2, say one traditional striker, one traditional winger, and a tendency to use one holding midfielder. Unfortunately, this definition fails to distinguish the 4-4-2 from the 4-2-3-1.

For example, Arsenal plays with one center-forward (van Persie), one traditional winger (Walcott or Gervinho), and one holding midfielder (Wilshere liking to attack). Similarly, Manchester City plays with one traditional center-forward (Dzeko); they have on occasion used Adam Johnson as a natural winger; and they can play with one holding midfielder: Milner loves to attack and Gareth Barry showed in the last match that he can do this as well.

Perhaps there is some way to draw a line between these 4-4-2s and 4-2-3-1s. For example, we could try to argue that Rooney is a striker even when he plays in midfield, and Yaya Toure is a midfielder even when he plays as a striker. But it seems to me that we are really splitting hairs at this point.

The reality is the 4-4-2s used by top teams are very similar to 4-2-3-1s. No top team plays a real 4-4-2 anymore. And the commentators who are calling for Manchester City to play a 4-4-2 simply don't know what they are talking about.

Mancini Shows the Flexibility in His Tactical Approach

It is of course only one match, but I feel that I came away from this one with more insight into Mancini's tactical plans for this season.

Many have noted that Mancini appeared to have "loosened the reins" or "released the handbrake". There is something to that, which I'll come to shortly. However, more generally, my main takeaway from this match was that Mancini's tactical approach has more flexibility than many have suggested.

I'll start by talking about the first 60 minutes of the match, where all would agree that City were playing their usual formation. When Aguero was substituted, some changes occurred, which I'll talk about later on.

With that in mind, the following are the key points that caught my attention during the match.

Holding Players

As many are already aware, Mancini's usual formation, the 4-2-3-1, features two holding midfielders (the "2" part, just in front of the defenders). Many accused Mancini early on of playing with three holding midfielders, because of the presence of Yaya Toure. Hopefully, everyone is well aware now that this was not the case. Toure is used by Mancini as an attacking player, and his key goals in the FA cup demonstrate his importance in attack. (That said, he is a beast on the defensive end as well.)

Two holding midfielders is the usual, but in this match, we saw Mancini also happy to use only one holding midfielder. In particular, even though Mancini wrote the usual 4-2-3-1 on the team sheet, one of the "2" players, Gareth Barry, was given the green light to attack.

Indeed, we could see right from the starting whistle that Barry was going to be playing forward. First in defense:


Barry and Yaya Toure in line on the right. de Jong further back on the left.

and then in attack:


Barry, getting forward in attack, feeds the ball to Silva.

This continued throughout the first 60 minutes:


Barry moves up with the ball and feeds Silva.


Barry about to feed Silva again. Silva now playing center-forward.


Barry receives the ball on the left wing.


Barry runs forward of Toure and Silva.


Barry pushes forward with the ball.

Later on, when de Jong was substituted out (for Aguero), the two central midfielders were Yaya Toure and Gareth Barry. Here too, one was allowed to attack. But in this case, as both Toure and Barry are capable attackers (whereas de Jong seems to be defensive minded in general), they took it in turn to go forward. For example, here is Barry getting forward:


Barry shown top/center, making a forward run. (Note: goal now on the left side.)

Last week, during the Community Shield match, Barry's role was played by James Milner, who also had a license to get forward in attack. However, as I pointed out in my previous post, he seemed to go too far. Perhaps he was less astute than Barry about finding the times at which to get forward, but in any case, the result was that Milner and Yaya rarely were forward together, so instead of an extra attacker we got a Milner-for-Yaya swap.

In this match, Barry seemed to get the balance just right. As can be seen in the pictures, he was often forward at the same time as Toure, adding to the attack rather than subtracting from it.

Players Up Front

I keep hearing commentators saying that Mancini needs two up front. Here again, he showed that he can do this within his same 4-2-3-1 by having one of the "3" midfielders push forward:


Yaya Toure and Dzeko up top.


Silva and Dzeko up top.


Yaya Toure and Dzeko up top again.

Or if Dzeko wants to move out of center, then two of the "3" midfielders can go up top:


Dzeko with the ball on the left side. Silva and Adam Johnson up top.

Movement

A midfielder moving along side Dzeko, up top, is only a special case of a more general trend we saw in this match: movement amongst the attacking players. Mancini has often spoken in the past about the need for more movement from these players. In this match, I would have to think he got what he wanted.

Dzeko in particular was all over the place. Here is Dzeko dropping deep:


Dzeko, in the center of the picture, asking for the ball.


Dzeko with the ball, deeper now than Silva.

Dzeko on the left:


Dzeko charges down the left side with the ball.


Dzeko lines up the left side.


Dzeko with the ball on the left side.


Dzeko with the ball on the left side again.

Dzeko on the right:


Dzeko with the ball on the right side.

Dzeko the attacking midfielder:


Dzeko with the ball, looking to feed Silva.

The other attacking players also had lots of movement. The pictures above show Johnson, Silva, and Toure all playing the center-forward. Here's another one:


Johnson and Toure attacking in the center.

But we also saw wide players dropping deeper or more central:


Johnson with the ball, central and deeper.


Silva dropping deeper in the center. He does this all the time....

We saw Yaya Toure moving out of his central position to play on the right side:

Yaya Toure receiving the ball on the right side.

Even Gareth Barry was seen attacking centrally and on either side, as we saw above.

In general, this was a wonderful display of fluid movement by all the attacking players. And I should think this is exactly the sort of movement Mancini has been asking for. This sort of movement poses dilemmas for defenders as they have to determine in each case whether to follow the attacking player (opening up space behind them) or let them go free. The more movement they have, the more likely they are to find space open up somewhere in a critical area.

Width

Aside from fast breaks, it is still a fairly accurate statement to say that "width" in the form of crosses comes solely from the fullbacks in Mancini's system.

The term "width" also (at least to me) means having an outlet on the side(s) to pass the ball. Since this is a less dangerous area, defenses often leave space available there. And when the defense is pressing and bearing down on the central attackers with the ball, an attacker stationed out wide can be an easy place to send the ball to safety.

In this match, many commented on Johnson providing width, presumably in this sense (since he rarely crosses the ball). However, as we saw above, Dzeko also lined up to the left of the defenders on occasion. Yaya Toure moved out to the right. And Silva moved off to the left.

Overall Attacking Performance (In the First 60 Minutes)

In the first half alone, City produced 19 shots on goal, 7 of them on target. And those numbers may not even include all shots that were blocked. City hit the post twice. Indeed, they had 8 chances where some commentators would have said they "should have scored". It required some amount of luck and an extraordinary performance from their goalkeeper for Swansea to keep City at bay for the 45 minutes.

The second half continued just as the first half ended. City produced more quality chances. Finally, one of them went in: when keeper Vorm palmed away Johnson's shot, Dzeko was waiting there to shove it into the back of the net.

A score of 1-0 at 60 minutes, in my view, was still flattering to the away team. City easily could have scored multiple goals by then.

Aguero's Introduction

When Sergio Aguero was substituted for de Jong at about 60 minutes, City changed to a 4-4-2 formation, according to the commentators. This gave us a brief look at another tactical approach by Mancini.

My impression, at this point, was that both Dzeko and Aguero would be playing as center-forwards. But this did not happen for the most part. Aguero mostly played deep:


Aguero playing deep, between Silva and Johnson, as in a 4-2-3-1.


Aguero deep, level with Silva. Barry making a run at the top.

As we saw above, Dzeko also played deep in the first half. And that continued here:


Dzeko drops deeper to pick up the ball. Aguero now up top.

Aguero also played out to the right (as Yaya did earlier):


Aguero moves to the right. Dzeko and Silva now up top.

There were very few moments when Dzeko and Aguero were both up front. One important such moment, though, was the 2nd goal: Richards sent a cross along the ground in front of goal, Dzeko and Aguero were both charging at goal, and Aguero poked it in at the back post. However, as we saw in the pictures above, Silva, Johnson, and Yaya Toure also played this role earlier, especially in this same situation (crosses along the ground on fast breaks).

Overall, it was hard for me to see exactly what the tactical differences were upon Aguerio's introduction. In addition to the fact that neither Dzeko nor Aguero was playing up top all that much, we also didn't get to see the new formation for very long.

At 74 minutes (less than 15 minutes after Aguero came on), Savic was substituted for Johnson. As a result, Clichy was moved up to midfield. Compared to Johnson, Clichy was very reluctant to get forward. So from that point, we had fewer attackers involved up front.

At 82 minutes (just over 20 minutes after Aguero came on), Milner was substituted for Silva. Now the two wide players were Clichy and Yaya Toure, both of whom were now playing out of position. Hence, I'm very reluctant to draw any conclusions from the last 10 minutes of the match.

On the basis of the three goals scored after Aguero came on, the Church of the 4-4-2 is declaring victory. Personally, I am not convinced, as you can see from my thinking above.

My overall impressions of the last 30 minutes are these:

• Aguero is a special player. The third goal didn't seem like a chance that was any better than the 8 created in the first half, and yet Aguero with a bit of luck and a lot of brilliance, created a goal out of it by kicking the ball over the keeper and then backward, behind him, to David Silva. The fourth goal similarly did not seem all that threatening. Toure, Silva, and Johnson all had shots from even closer in the first half, but Aguero's went in. Maybe this is just a fluke, but one gets the impression that he is a very special talent.
  
  
• Dzeko, Aguero, and Silva seemed to link up well. Dzeko and Aguero each tried to backheel to the other once. Neither worked, but one got the impression that, in a short time, it will start working.
  
  
• The other attacking players seemed a bit more reserved in the 4-4-2, perhaps due to its unfamiliarity. This is another reason I can't see why this formation made the team more attacking. In many cases, we had fewer attacking players.
  
  
• City were also helped by the fact that Swansea were getting worn down. Also, after the first goal, Swansea made substitutions that, according to the commentators, showed they were going for it, becoming even more attack minded. Pushing more players forward opened up more room at the back, which made it easier for City to score.
  

Conclusions

All in all, that was a great performance by City's attacking players, particularly in the first 60 minutes, and a great performance by Sergio Aguero in the last 30.

It will be interesting to see how Mancini deploys his men in the upcoming matches. My best guess is that Mancini used a 4-4-2 this time because it would be most familiar to Aguero, and that in the next match, we'll see a 4-2-3-1 with Aguero playing in Yaya Toure's position. If that happens, I expect to see an incredible display by fluid attacking players. I also expect members of the Church of the 4-4-2 to groan and complain the whole time.

A Painless Review of the Community Shield (OR: Why I Blame Milner For City's Loss)

For Manchester City fans like myself with heightened expectations going into the new season, the loss of the Community Shield was extremely painful. For a while, I simply wanted to crawl back into bed and hope to wake up and find it was just a bad dream. But the better part of me knew the right thing to do is try understand what happened on the pitch and what City need to do to improve.

I finally gathered the strength to watch the Community Shield match again now, and I'm glad I did. I think I've finally made peace with what happened.

For those who have more effectively blocked the match from their memory, remember this: the score was 2-2 at 60 minutes. United and City played a relatively even match for the last 35 minutes. If anything, City was gaining strength as the game went on, and to my view, the final goal in injury time was against the run of play. Had it not been for that freak mistake by Kompany, I don't know that any of us would feel so poorly about our team.

A Game of Three Thirds

Unlike the typical match, I think this one is better described as a game of three thirds rather than a game of two halves. Each third featured a different combination of formations and styles by the two teams. Much of what happened on the pitch is explainable in terms of these tactical match-ups.

This is of course not to say that United did not play better in general. United looked "sharper" in the sense that they completed more of their passes. City had an uncharacteristically large fraction of their passes go astray, particularly toward the beginning of the match.

However, I don't think that City fans should be overly worried about "sharpness". There are an awful lot of games to come, so City players will get plenty of time to find their touch and start to play together more fluidly.

Many commentators also talked about United's "higher intensity". However, I think this is misleading. What sticks out in your mind is United's high pressing (when City had the ball in their own third) and the speed of their counter-attacks. But this is just the usual United style against big teams. They played the same way against Barcelona, for example, as well as against City in the FA cup. Both times, they walked away empty handed. In short, I think this perceived "intensity" is simply style over substance.

Putting aside sharpness and intensity, the best way to understand what happened in this particular match is via tactics. Furthermore, while the sharpness and form of both teams will be different when these two teams meet again, the tactical questions will remain the same.

So let's look in more detail at what happened tactically in the match. Then let's look ahead at what City will need to do this season.

First Third (0-0)

In the first third, this was much like a rematch of the FA Cup semifinal. United started strongly, while City grew into the match. While United had plenty of possession, they could not create dangerous chances. The reason for this was City's dominance in midfield.

City lined up in their usual 4-2-3-1:


and United in their usual 4-4-2:


In principle, this means City should have a 3 versus 2 (Yaya, Milner, de Jong v Carrick, Anderson) advantage in midfield, and that his indeed how it worked out.

City's dominance of midfield meant that United could only get forward by pushing out to the wings. Their two wingers (Young and Nani) would then send crosses into the box.

When City dominate midfield in this formation, this is often what happens. In other words, City expect teams to attack them in this way, via crosses from the wings. Because our two centerbacks (Lescott and Kompany) have so much protection in front of them, they can worry less about attacks from the front and focus more on attacks from the wings. The end result is that Lescott and Kompany eat these sorts of crosses for breakfast.

This is the reason that, even though United had most of the possession (due to City's poor passing), they weren't able to create many dangerous chances.

In that way, this part of the match followed along the same lines as the FA Cup semifinal. In that match, City dominated midfield and forced United out to the wings. City's defensive line-up prevented United from scoring, but made things a bit harder going forward. However, as the match went on, City got forward more, and in the end, the outcome was was settled by a single goal from Yaya Toure.

However, there was one difference between this line-up and that of the FA Cup semifinal: James Milner was playing in place of James Barry. This difference turned out to be an important one.

The key difference between these two players is that James Milner loves to get forward.

Indeed, he does it so much, you have to wonder whether he forgets what his position actually is. Sometimes he thinks he's the attacking midfielder:


Other times, he thinks he's a striker:




Now, in principle, I suppose we should be happy that Milner wants to attack. But when Milner wants to play out of position, that means some other positionally disciplined player will have to take over his role. In this case, that other player was Yaya Toure. So the effect of Milner pushing forward is that City had Milner attacking instead of Yaya Toure. And I'm not convinced that is such a good trade.

Yaya Toure is a uniquely talented player. He's one of the biggest and strongest players on the pitch. And surprisingly, he's also one of the fastest. Even in this match, on one occasion, he ran away from a smaller United player that anyone would guess was faster.

His combination of physical characteristics means that almost no one can get the ball away him. He provides an ideal target for moving the ball from defense into attack. As we saw in the FA Cup semifinal, he can score goals. And he can also defend extremely well. Indeed, given all of this, one has to wonder whether Mancini's best transfer purchase for City was not Yaya Toure.

With that in mind, is it a positive move to have Milner playing in Yaya Toure's role? I think not. But Milner's constant forward movement meant Yaya felt he had to stay back, so the Milner for Yaya swap was indeed what happened.

Second Third (2-2)

The middle third was also even, but much more open. City changed positions and United changed tactics. Both sides scored twice.

Milner's movement in the first part of the game created a dilemma for Mancini: what should he do about Milner playing in Yaya's role?

In the 36th minute, he decided the best option was to let Milner attack, but he needed to make sure that there was some creativity in central midfield as well. His decision was to move Milner onto the wing and move Silva centrally. So in effect, Silva was playing in Yaya's original role (attacking midfielder), Milner was in Silva's (wing), and Yaya was in Milner's (defensive midfielder).

For a time, this switch worked very well. Silva assisted the first goal and was involved in everything that was going on up front, including the second goal. Indeed, this appeared to be a very good move offensively.

Unfortunately, the outcome of matches is not determined solely by what your team does. The other team gets their say as well.

In the second half, Fergie's men changed tactics. He knew they were getting overrun in midfield, so he asked his four attacking players (Rooney, Wellbeck, Nani, and Young) to take turns dropping back into midfield. Each attacking player took a turn, though Rooney the most often.

Technically, this brought the midfield battle to 3 versus 3. However, this was also not the same 3 that City had used in the first half. In particular, Silva was now playing in Yaya's role. And while Silva does work hard in defense, he is not Yaya Toure.

United quickly started to get the upper hand in midfield, and they started to create chances through the middle. This finally started to create real danger for City.

United's first goal was nearly identical to City's first. Each was scored from a set piece, a free kick about 25 yards out and near the sideline. Both balls were floated into the box where a defender (Lescott and Smalling) managed to get free with the ball to score an easy goal.

United's second goal was rather different. It was scored right through the center, where United now had numbers. They had not only their 4 attacking players involved, but also Cleverly was able to get forward and bring a fifth body into the penalty area.

United should be given credit for what was a great goal. However, the tactical situation did not help City here. Silva's defensive responsibilities on the wing are different from those playing in central midfield. Indeed, the ball was played past Silva in the move that led to the goal, and one has to wonder whether the bigger faster Yaya Toure would have been able to do more to stop it.

Possibly worse than that, however, was the fact that Balotelli did not track back at all during that drive by United. Balotelli was on the wing, while United went mostly through the center, but Balotelli should have been closeby, which may have freed up other players to help stop United.

Final Third (0-1)

The final third was even and tight. City reverted to their original tactics, while United stuck with those that had worked in the second half. City grew stronger as the match went on, but both sides continued to create chances. Finally, a freak mistake by Kompany allowed the game winner.

Immediately after the second goal, Mancini changed again. He needed to get Yaya back into his attacking position, so he brought Gareth Barry in and withdrew an attacking player. The player he chose to remove was Balotelli, most likely because he had failed to track back just before. (Later on, he would also switch Milner for Johnson, but that was a like-for-like substitution that did not change the tactical situation.)

These changes immediately made City more solid defensively. Had United gone back to their first half tactics as well, we might well have seen a repeat of the FA Cup semifinal. However, United stuck with their new approach: attackers dropping into midfield to make it 3 versus 3. The result was an even match, where both sides were able to create chances.

Nonetheless, the remaining 30 minutes of regular time passed without a goal from either team. City grew into the game more and more, finally getting some sustained pressure on United in the final 10 minutes. But the match remained quite even and could well have gone either way. (Of course, you know what way it went.)

What the Future Holds

What can we learn from this about the remainder of City's season?

First off, as I said above, I think we don't need to worry about sharpness. That will come for City. Indeed, City already looked quite sharp against Intern Milan, and what seemed like a lack of sharpness here may have been more about giving too much respect to United.

Tactically, the big questions relate to how City will play in big matches:

• Can James Milner stay defensively disciplined and curb his enthusiasm for getting forward? If not, then I don't expect him to play against big teams. This Milner for Yaya switch did not work well and does not seem like a good idea in any case.
  
  
• Can Silva or Nasri or Aguero play in Yaya's role? At this point, I would have to think the answer is no. Silva was not the same defensive force as Yaya, and I see no reason to think that Nasri or Aguero would do any better. Yaya is unique, and we need him in this position for these matches.
  

Against smaller teams, we may well see Milner pushing forward or even a 4-4-2 formation. I'm sure that will produce some exciting football. But when City play against United, Chelsea, Arsenal, and other top teams, my best guess is that Yaya will continue to be the key player.

Does Saying No to Racism Mean Saying No to FFP?

One of the interesting trends during the summer transfer window has been Liverpool's apparent interest in signing British players. Actually, not just signing them but (it would seem) overpaying for British players. A recent joke sums it up well: "Joey Barton has been released on a free. Liverpool have submitted a £30m bid."

Now, I have no idea why Liverpool has signed these players. Maybe it has nothing to do with their being British. Maybe these are just a players that Liverpool thinks have some talent others have missed.

I don't want to speculate about what Dalgish and Comolli are thinking. But Liverpool's buying does raise an interesting hypothetical: what if some team (not Liverpool) thought that they could make more money by signing white players? What if they thought they could sell more jerseys with more white players on the team?

This hypothetical does not worry me too much under normal conditions because I actually don't think the purpose of a football club is to make money. The purpose of a football club is to win trophies.

Indeed, despite how much some fans complain about clubs that spend a lot in order to win (e.g. Chelsea, Man City), fans also have unbridled scorn for clubs that actually try to make money rather than trying to win. The fact that Newcastle has not (yet) spent the money gained from selling Andy Carroll and Kevin Nolan to buy new players has rightfully been pilloried. Arsenal has also not been spending, and if they do not spend by the end of the summer (especially if they sell Cesc and or Nasri), I would similarly expect outrage.

Owners that want to win — either instinctively or because fans hold their feet to the fire — should not display the sort of racism described above. If a black player is better than a white player, the owner who wants to win will sign the black player, even if that does mean selling fewer jerseys.

At least, they would have in years past. But what about today?

With financial fair play (FFP), the situation is not so nice. If the white player will sell more jerseys, then he is effectively cheaper under FFP rules because the jersey sales cancel out some of the fees and wages of the player. Hence, FFP may be creating a situation where the game is systematically biased in favor of white players.

To those who think there is no alternative but to adopt FFP, I would point out that that this argument does not apply to salary caps, like those used in the NFL and NBA, because the limits are applied only to wages not to the total revenues of the club (which includes jersey sales).

Is this scenario described (of systematic bias in favor of white players) likely to arise in the EPL? Hopefully not. But the fact that FFP would seem to incentivize racism adds to the list of problems with FFP that others have pointed out. Unlike a salary cap, it is anti-competitive: it makes it harder for teams lower in standing now to move up. It may even be anti-competitive in a legal sense, i.e., it might be illegal.

Above all, this gives yet one more counter-argument to claims that FFP is necessary to save football. FFP creates many new problems, ones that comparable approaches in other sports (like salary caps) do not have. Hopefully, UEFA will come to their senses and look at salary caps instead, but don't hold your breath.

Update: Some may not like the alternative of a salary cap (perhaps because they don't want the league to be "that equal"). However, salary caps are not the only alternative. Another is a "luxury tax" like that used in the MLB.

In this system, there is a limit on salary but it is not a hard limit. Clubs can spend more than the limit, but the league charges them a tax on this excess amount and (I think) distributes the money to the other teams. This allows clubs in major cities to retain some advantage. However, the luxury tax also does not have the problem of incentivizing racism. It is still in the best interest of every club to pick the best players regardless of race, just as with a salary cap.