In today's match between Manchester City and Norwich City, one aspect that caught my attention was the influence of Samir Nasri. For only the third time this season, Nasri completed more passes than David Silva in a match when both started. One of those was the very first match that Nasri played for City in the league. Since then, Silva has been the dominant creative influence for City in every match save one, when Silva was man-marked for most of the match against Everton.
In Nasri's first four matches, both he and Silva played all over the midfield, in some sense playing the same position. Against Spurs, this seemed to work well, with both players completing over 60 passes. Against Wigan, though, it did not seem to work, as Nasri had little influence, completing half as many passes. It worked a bit better against Fulham, but over all of those four matches, the record is not great.
Starting with the match at Blackburn, the tactics changed somewhat: Nasri played more out wide. He was mostly left against Blackburn and Liverpool, and mostly right against Wolves and United, but all the while, he was playing mostly to one side or the other
Over that same period, there were three matches (Aston Villa, QPR, and Newcastle) in which only one of the two started.
At the end of this period, I had the impression that the two did not play especially well together. If anything, it seemed as though Milner playing in a wide role was able to link up better with Silva.
However, today's match showed yet another approach. Nasri played centrally, rather than wide, but unlike those early matches, he played slightly deeper than Silva. These Guardian chalkboard shows the subtle difference in their passing:
In some sense, it may be fairer to say that, rather than Nasri playing deeper, Silva played further forward. Most of his passing in previous matches looks much like Nasri's in this one, whereas in this match, he stayed closer to the strikers.
One should keep in mind that Silva plays further forward for the Spanish national team. And while he does drop deep to get the ball for City, he often rushes back, and I often get the impression that he wants to be closer to goal, able to link up with the strikers to create goals or score them himself.
Nasri playing deeper is also interesting for another reason. As Michael Cox of zonalmarking.net has suggested, the one thing that City may be lacking, compared to the top sides in Europe, is a deep-lying playmaker. Someone like a Xabi Alonso, say, who can start attacks and make exceptionally accurate long passes. Such players are hence able score from free kicks.
Oh, did I mention that Nasri scored from a free kick today?
As I always try to remind myself, this was only one match. Nasri's deeper positioning in this match may have been a one-off. But it also may be a glimpse of the future. Time will tell.
Saturday, December 3, 2011
Monday, November 28, 2011
Cheaty Divers
Based on last weekend's match between Liverpool and Man City, one would have to say that Luis Suarez's reputation for diving is well deserved. He appears to hit the ground in response to any attempted tackle by opponents, successful or not. At one point, during this match, he actually went studs up into the defender (Vincent Kompany) and then fell on the ground as if he had been fouled!
The individual efforts of Suarez probably explain much of the difference in fouls received in the match (11 v 15). However, there were other notable refereeing decisions that went Liverpools way. In particular, goalkeeper Reina not receiving a card for deliberately handling outside his penalty box and Mario Balotelli's second yellow card. A few in the media have agreed with the latter decision; however, on average, those in the media have suggested it was harsh. All together, there were plenty of reasons for Man City fans to feel aggrieved.
That said, it seems unlikely that any of this, aside from Reina receiving a card, would have changed the outcome of the match. However, deliberate attempts to draw cards either by diving (Suarez) or surrounding the referee (the rest of the Liverpool squad) is not what any fan wants to see. As Roberto Mancini said after the match, "this is not football."
I was left wondering whether this was a one-off for Liverpool or rather a general strategy. In other words, is diving and surrounding the referee now part of the Liverpool way?
To try to understand this, I analyzed fouls in matches using the same technique as I would model goals. Each team gets an "attack" score, which measures how much they foul, and a "defense" score, which measures how much they draw fouls for the other team.*
What do the statistics tell us then?
Broadly, they show that most teams foul at about the same rate. There are a few teams that foul less than usual: Swansea, Norwich, and Man United. Swansea, in particular, foul very little, while the other two foul only a tiny bit less than usual. At the other end, Blackburn and Wigan foul a bit more than usual.
That describes how much each team fouls. The more interesting part is how much each team draws fouls from their opponent.
First off, the statistics do not show that Liverpool are cheaty divers. While they may have displayed some unsporting behavior in this match versus Man City, the model does not suggest they draw fouls any more than other teams in general.
However, some teams do appear to draw fouls. Chelsea, Wolves, and Newcastle draw a few. But the leader in this department, by a huge margin, are Queen's Park Rangers. The amount of fouls they draw is about the same as the difference in fouls between Swansea and an average team, which is quite big. In other words, when Swansea plays against QPR, we would expect them to receive as many fouls as an average team. An average team, on the other hand, should receive quite a few more fouls than usual when playing against QPR.
There is one more possibility afforded by the model, which we have not yet discussed. It's possible for a team not to draw fouls from their opponent but somehow to suppress them. In other words, are there teams whose opponents systematically receive fewer fouls than they should?
It turns out this does indeed happen to one team: Man City. Somehow, when teams play Man City, either they choose not to foul as much as usual or the referee chooses not to call them as often as usual. Furthermore, the effect is not small. It's the third largest effect in the model after Swansea's not fouling and QPR's drawing fouls.
So are teams especially timid when playing against Man City or are the referees biased against them? I'll leave that to you to decide.
(*) As usual, I "regularized" my model, which means I only allowed new variables if the improvement in fit outweighs the extra complexity they add to the model. I.e., Occam's razor was applied.
The individual efforts of Suarez probably explain much of the difference in fouls received in the match (11 v 15). However, there were other notable refereeing decisions that went Liverpools way. In particular, goalkeeper Reina not receiving a card for deliberately handling outside his penalty box and Mario Balotelli's second yellow card. A few in the media have agreed with the latter decision; however, on average, those in the media have suggested it was harsh. All together, there were plenty of reasons for Man City fans to feel aggrieved.
That said, it seems unlikely that any of this, aside from Reina receiving a card, would have changed the outcome of the match. However, deliberate attempts to draw cards either by diving (Suarez) or surrounding the referee (the rest of the Liverpool squad) is not what any fan wants to see. As Roberto Mancini said after the match, "this is not football."
I was left wondering whether this was a one-off for Liverpool or rather a general strategy. In other words, is diving and surrounding the referee now part of the Liverpool way?
To try to understand this, I analyzed fouls in matches using the same technique as I would model goals. Each team gets an "attack" score, which measures how much they foul, and a "defense" score, which measures how much they draw fouls for the other team.*
What do the statistics tell us then?
Broadly, they show that most teams foul at about the same rate. There are a few teams that foul less than usual: Swansea, Norwich, and Man United. Swansea, in particular, foul very little, while the other two foul only a tiny bit less than usual. At the other end, Blackburn and Wigan foul a bit more than usual.
That describes how much each team fouls. The more interesting part is how much each team draws fouls from their opponent.
First off, the statistics do not show that Liverpool are cheaty divers. While they may have displayed some unsporting behavior in this match versus Man City, the model does not suggest they draw fouls any more than other teams in general.
However, some teams do appear to draw fouls. Chelsea, Wolves, and Newcastle draw a few. But the leader in this department, by a huge margin, are Queen's Park Rangers. The amount of fouls they draw is about the same as the difference in fouls between Swansea and an average team, which is quite big. In other words, when Swansea plays against QPR, we would expect them to receive as many fouls as an average team. An average team, on the other hand, should receive quite a few more fouls than usual when playing against QPR.
There is one more possibility afforded by the model, which we have not yet discussed. It's possible for a team not to draw fouls from their opponent but somehow to suppress them. In other words, are there teams whose opponents systematically receive fewer fouls than they should?
It turns out this does indeed happen to one team: Man City. Somehow, when teams play Man City, either they choose not to foul as much as usual or the referee chooses not to call them as often as usual. Furthermore, the effect is not small. It's the third largest effect in the model after Swansea's not fouling and QPR's drawing fouls.
So are teams especially timid when playing against Man City or are the referees biased against them? I'll leave that to you to decide.
(*) As usual, I "regularized" my model, which means I only allowed new variables if the improvement in fit outweighs the extra complexity they add to the model. I.e., Occam's razor was applied.
Wednesday, November 23, 2011
4-4-2 versus 4-2-3-1
We have previously discussed on the fact that no top team plays a traditional 4-4-2 today and that the current version of the 4-4-2 played by, say Manchester United, is not especially different from a 4-2-3-1. Zonal Marking, in his review of Napoli v Man City, strikes the same note:
Of course, when you play with two attack-minded wide players plus one striker dropping off into the hole, 4-4-2 and 4-2-3-1 are, if not interchangeable, not significantly different.
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
Beware of Hindsight Bias
The book "Future Babble", which I'm just finishing at the moment, mentions a new type of cognitive bias that I had not heard of before: hindsight bias. This can be seen, for example, when fans say after a match that the outcome was inevitable, say, as a result of the tactics used by the manager or his player choices.
The bias is not simply that people become more convinced after-the-fact that this outcome was always going to occur. People actually become more convinced that they knew beforehand that this was going to happen. Numerous experiments, comparing people's memories of their certainty with recordings made before the event, have shown this effect to be quite strong.
Further experiments showed that typical post-match analysis actually makes this bias worse. Two psychologists from Northwestern University studied fans at American college football matches and asked some of them to analyze the match in certain ways. (Their paper is called "Perceptions of Purple: Counterfactual and Hindsight Judgments at Northwestern Wildcats Football Games" in case you want to look it up.)
Before the match, fans gave what would be the actual outcome of the match a less than 15% chance of occurring. After the match, fans recalled their own predictions were of a 30% chance of occuring. Amazingly, fans who were asked to analyze the match — in terms of what could have been done differently or what caused the result — recalled their own predictions were higher than 50%!
Clearly, most fans who think about football as much as we do are doing exactly the sort of analysis performed in the experiment. Hence, we are quite likely to fall victim to hindsight bias.
In my mind, this highlights once again the importance of looking at football statistics. Of course, statistics can't eliminate hindsight bias, but they can do two things.
First, they can suggest that some inevitability arguments are implausible. For example, a claim that the team lost because one player started in place of another would seem suspect if statistics show the one who played created just as many chances, had just as many successful tackles, etc. as would have been predicted for the other player.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, statistics can remind you that football involves a lot more chance than most people are willing to admit.
The bias is not simply that people become more convinced after-the-fact that this outcome was always going to occur. People actually become more convinced that they knew beforehand that this was going to happen. Numerous experiments, comparing people's memories of their certainty with recordings made before the event, have shown this effect to be quite strong.
Further experiments showed that typical post-match analysis actually makes this bias worse. Two psychologists from Northwestern University studied fans at American college football matches and asked some of them to analyze the match in certain ways. (Their paper is called "Perceptions of Purple: Counterfactual and Hindsight Judgments at Northwestern Wildcats Football Games" in case you want to look it up.)
Before the match, fans gave what would be the actual outcome of the match a less than 15% chance of occurring. After the match, fans recalled their own predictions were of a 30% chance of occuring. Amazingly, fans who were asked to analyze the match — in terms of what could have been done differently or what caused the result — recalled their own predictions were higher than 50%!
Clearly, most fans who think about football as much as we do are doing exactly the sort of analysis performed in the experiment. Hence, we are quite likely to fall victim to hindsight bias.
In my mind, this highlights once again the importance of looking at football statistics. Of course, statistics can't eliminate hindsight bias, but they can do two things.
First, they can suggest that some inevitability arguments are implausible. For example, a claim that the team lost because one player started in place of another would seem suspect if statistics show the one who played created just as many chances, had just as many successful tackles, etc. as would have been predicted for the other player.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, statistics can remind you that football involves a lot more chance than most people are willing to admit.
Saturday, October 1, 2011
Random Tactical Notes on Manchester City
A couple of random things that I noted during Manchester City's match versus Blackburn Rovers:
- For at least the third time, Kolarov was used as a midfielder.
This intrigues me because of the fact that Gael Clichy seems to be the #1 left fullback at this point in time. Compared to Clichy, Kolarov seems (to me at least) to be more of an attacking threat. He is good at delivering crosses into the box, and as is well known, he likes to take shots from long range. Because of his attacking strength, I wonder whether Mancini imagines a continued role for Kolarov as a left winger.
Why is this a possibility? First, note that many players have switched from winger to fullback or vice versa. For example, Gareth Bale moved up from fullback to be a winger. Second, Manchester City do not have a traditional winger on the left side. Adam Johnson can play this role on the right, but the left position is almost always held by David Silva, who is clearly not a traditional winger. Having the option of real width on the left side may be something that Mancini wants to have in his toolbox. - Nasri has a stronger tendency than Silva to attack the penalty box from wide areas.
Compared to Silva's dazzling work, Nasri's has seemed somewhat lackluster. However, the numbers do not lie: both Nasri and Silva have produced 4 assists this season. Hence, Nasri is clearly contributing a great deal to the team.
In this game, however, I noticed that Nasri's assists were provided while attacking the penalty box from the left wing. Looking back over the previous four matches, this was not out of the ordinary. While Silva has also done this at times, Nasri has shown a stronger tendency to attack from the side.
Like everyone else, I continue to wonder how Nasri and Silva will work together. At least at this point, it seems that Silva spends more time in central positions, looking to pass through the middle, and Nasri spends more time in wide areas, looking to pass from there. Obviously, these two roles are complementary. Is that the division of labor that will continue going forward? It will be interesting to see.
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Holding Midfielders and Fullbacks
The excellent blog, 11tegen11, makes a good point in this post regarding the tradeoffs between holding midfielders and fullbacks by top clubs:
This insight was missed last season, for example, when some compared Man City's use of two holding midfielders to Arsenal's use of one holding without noting the different using of fullbacks (Man City's were more attacking). Looking at holding midfielders in isolation, one would think that Arsenal were the more attacking side, but it's important to consider fullbacks as well. Then it becomes clear that the clubs were using the same number of attacking players in general.
Other teams, as evidenced by the recently published UEFA Champions League technical report, maintain their balance either by covering their defensive line with conservative use of their full backs while playing a single holding midfielder, or by covering their offensive full backs by deploying two conservative holding midfielders.
This insight was missed last season, for example, when some compared Man City's use of two holding midfielders to Arsenal's use of one holding without noting the different using of fullbacks (Man City's were more attacking). Looking at holding midfielders in isolation, one would think that Arsenal were the more attacking side, but it's important to consider fullbacks as well. Then it becomes clear that the clubs were using the same number of attacking players in general.
Sunday, September 25, 2011
Thoughts Ahead of Bayern Munich v Manchester City
Ahead of Man City's match with Bayern Munich this week, I watched Bayern's match in the Bundesliga with Bayer Leverkusen, hoping to get a sense of what will be in store for City.
Bayern most reminded me of the Man United of last season.
It wasn't just that they have at least a couple of players that have been linked with Man United in the past (right back, Lahm, and goalkeeper, Neuer). Nor was it the fact that the referee was obviously in Bayern's employ, handing out 4 yellow cards to Bayer Leverkusen versus 1 to Bayern for very similar tackles. It wasn't even the dive that would have made Nani proud. (The offender was actually screaming before contact occurred, if there was any contact at all.) No, it was mostly their style of play.
Like United last season, they played in a surprisingly predictable way. In fact, in much the same predictable way.
First, they are fast on the counter, always moving quickly when they gain possession.
Second, nearly always, they attack down the flanks. If the winger can get past his man, he will cross in front of goal for a striker to tap it in. At least two thirds of the attacks I watched were of exactly this form. If the winger cannot get past, he will pass back into the center. Most likely, this is passed right back to the winger, a quick 1-2 to get past the defender and repeat as before (cross into the box). If that doesn't work, the winger can cut inside and let the fullback overlap and cross. Or he can pass the ball back to the midfielders / defenders to start over.
Only twice did I actually see shots from a central area. And in both of those cases, again, the attacks originally started on the flank.
In other words, much like United last season, even though they have a world class set of attackers, at least you have a pretty good idea of how they will come at you.
One might raise the objection to my comparison that Bayern do not play the same formation as Man United (4-2-3-1 versus 4-4-2). But like I suggested in my last post, this is mostly splitting hairs. United do not play with two up front either. Like United, Bayern play with one traditional winger (Ribery can cross with his left foot) and one inverted winger (Robben). And like United, they can play with either one or two holding midfielders.
Bayern Munich have had an incredible start to the Bundesliga season. After an initial 0-1 loss, they have won all 6 of their matches, scoring 19 goals and conceding none at all. In no match have they conceded more than 7 shots on goal, while they themselves have average 18 shots. Their goal difference after 7 matches is better than some of the famous Bayern sides of the past.
That said, I am reluctant to read too much into these results given that this is nearly the same team as last season, which struggled at times. In the match I watched, only the goalkeeper (Neuer) and the right fullback (Rafinha) were new to Bayern. And the little I have heard of Neuer's start so far said that he has been shaky.
They also have a new coach, of course. However, his reputation (as I understand it) is for being a more traditional German manager. In this case, that means that he would be less attacking and more defensive than his predecessor, van Haal. Hence, that does little to explain Bayern's incredible attack so far this season.
Having described Bayern Munich as a team that plays like the title winning team of the Barclay's Premier League last season, a team that is rampaging through the current Bundesliga season, one would surely imagine that I will be predicting a tough night for Man City.
The odds makers too have Bayern Munich as the clear favorites.
Surprisingly, I feel differently. I am expecting a dominant performance from Man City.
Perhaps the reason is that, in the game I watched, Bayer Leverkusen were so poor. They barely put up a fight at all. Neither were Bayern Munich all that good either. Not only were they predictable, but also they didn't really seem to be playing especially well. Their passing wasn't extraordinarily accurate. Their finishing wasn't extraordinarily clinical.
Perhaps the reason is that, as I mentioned above, this is largely the same team as last season, which struggled for long periods. They do have a new coach, but as my comments in the past regarding Hodgson versus Dalglish have probably let on, I am skeptical that a manager can have much of an impact. Certainly, he has nowhere near as much as people like to think. And certainly, a manager cannot produce this sort of difference in a team in such a short period of time.
Perhaps it is the comparisons that are occurring in the German press with the legendary Bayern teams of the past, some now openly asking whether this Bayern team is the best of all time, that makes me so skeptical.
Unusually for me, I'm not sure that I really can articulate the reasons. Yet somehow, I'm expecting Man City to dominate this match. Whether the final score is 3-1 or 1-1 to City will depend on whether Manuel Neuer has another legendary performance. However, whatever the final score is, I am expecting there to be no question about which was the better team.
I may end up with a lot of egg on my face come tomorrow, especially if City have another nervous performance like they had against Napoli. But today, at least, I am not afraid of Bayern Munich.
Style of Play
Bayern most reminded me of the Man United of last season.
It wasn't just that they have at least a couple of players that have been linked with Man United in the past (right back, Lahm, and goalkeeper, Neuer). Nor was it the fact that the referee was obviously in Bayern's employ, handing out 4 yellow cards to Bayer Leverkusen versus 1 to Bayern for very similar tackles. It wasn't even the dive that would have made Nani proud. (The offender was actually screaming before contact occurred, if there was any contact at all.) No, it was mostly their style of play.
Like United last season, they played in a surprisingly predictable way. In fact, in much the same predictable way.
First, they are fast on the counter, always moving quickly when they gain possession.
Second, nearly always, they attack down the flanks. If the winger can get past his man, he will cross in front of goal for a striker to tap it in. At least two thirds of the attacks I watched were of exactly this form. If the winger cannot get past, he will pass back into the center. Most likely, this is passed right back to the winger, a quick 1-2 to get past the defender and repeat as before (cross into the box). If that doesn't work, the winger can cut inside and let the fullback overlap and cross. Or he can pass the ball back to the midfielders / defenders to start over.
Only twice did I actually see shots from a central area. And in both of those cases, again, the attacks originally started on the flank.
In other words, much like United last season, even though they have a world class set of attackers, at least you have a pretty good idea of how they will come at you.
One might raise the objection to my comparison that Bayern do not play the same formation as Man United (4-2-3-1 versus 4-4-2). But like I suggested in my last post, this is mostly splitting hairs. United do not play with two up front either. Like United, Bayern play with one traditional winger (Ribery can cross with his left foot) and one inverted winger (Robben). And like United, they can play with either one or two holding midfielders.
Season So Far
Bayern Munich have had an incredible start to the Bundesliga season. After an initial 0-1 loss, they have won all 6 of their matches, scoring 19 goals and conceding none at all. In no match have they conceded more than 7 shots on goal, while they themselves have average 18 shots. Their goal difference after 7 matches is better than some of the famous Bayern sides of the past.
That said, I am reluctant to read too much into these results given that this is nearly the same team as last season, which struggled at times. In the match I watched, only the goalkeeper (Neuer) and the right fullback (Rafinha) were new to Bayern. And the little I have heard of Neuer's start so far said that he has been shaky.
They also have a new coach, of course. However, his reputation (as I understand it) is for being a more traditional German manager. In this case, that means that he would be less attacking and more defensive than his predecessor, van Haal. Hence, that does little to explain Bayern's incredible attack so far this season.
Expectations
Having described Bayern Munich as a team that plays like the title winning team of the Barclay's Premier League last season, a team that is rampaging through the current Bundesliga season, one would surely imagine that I will be predicting a tough night for Man City.
The odds makers too have Bayern Munich as the clear favorites.
Surprisingly, I feel differently. I am expecting a dominant performance from Man City.
Perhaps the reason is that, in the game I watched, Bayer Leverkusen were so poor. They barely put up a fight at all. Neither were Bayern Munich all that good either. Not only were they predictable, but also they didn't really seem to be playing especially well. Their passing wasn't extraordinarily accurate. Their finishing wasn't extraordinarily clinical.
Perhaps the reason is that, as I mentioned above, this is largely the same team as last season, which struggled for long periods. They do have a new coach, but as my comments in the past regarding Hodgson versus Dalglish have probably let on, I am skeptical that a manager can have much of an impact. Certainly, he has nowhere near as much as people like to think. And certainly, a manager cannot produce this sort of difference in a team in such a short period of time.
Perhaps it is the comparisons that are occurring in the German press with the legendary Bayern teams of the past, some now openly asking whether this Bayern team is the best of all time, that makes me so skeptical.
Unusually for me, I'm not sure that I really can articulate the reasons. Yet somehow, I'm expecting Man City to dominate this match. Whether the final score is 3-1 or 1-1 to City will depend on whether Manuel Neuer has another legendary performance. However, whatever the final score is, I am expecting there to be no question about which was the better team.
I may end up with a lot of egg on my face come tomorrow, especially if City have another nervous performance like they had against Napoli. But today, at least, I am not afraid of Bayern Munich.
Friday, August 19, 2011
Questions About the 4-4-2
During Manchester City's first match of the season, versus Swansea, the commentators were once again shouting their typical refrain: "Mancini needs to be more positive. He needs to play two up front. He needs to play 4-4-2!"
This annoyed me more than usual, though, because City clearly were playing more attacking football. They made 19 shots on goal in the first half alone. That they didn't score in the first half owed much to an incredible performance by Swansea's goalkeeper, Vorm, and more than a bit of luck.
This perplexed me as well because City were, at that moment, playing with only one holding midfielder, something that I at least associate with a 4-4-2.
This left me with some burning questions. What do they even mean by a 4-4-2? And why do they associate it so strongly with attacking football?
Below, I will do my best to try to answer these questions.
Clearly not. Just consider some of the other teams that play a 4-2-3-1:
These are all teams that play attacking football. Indeed, the criticism of both Arsenal and van Gaal's Bayern Munich has been that they are weak at the back. van Gaal's team was described as "recklessly" attacking. I suppose some might note Mourinho's penchant for defensive play, but Real Madrid demands an attacking team, and the statistics above speak for themselves.
It's hard to come up with a precise definition of the 4-4-2. Indeed, coming up with precise definitions for even ordinary things is a lot more difficult than you might think. (What is a chair? It's something with four legs that you sit on. Ummm, that's also not a horse.)
Let me instead say that the 4-4-2 is a formation that often has with the following properties:
Of course, a given 4-4-2 need not have all of these properties. But actually, it's not clear that the 4-4-2, as played by the top teams, has any of these properties.
Of the top teams in the top 4 leagues, only two write 4-4-2 on their teamsheet: Manchester United and Liverpool. Let's consider how well these properties apply to their 4-4-2 formations.
If Ferguson can play one center-forward, only one natural winger, two holding midfielders, and call it a 4-4-2, perhaps Mancini should write 4-4-2 on his teamsheet and play his usual formation just to get the commentators off his back.
Based on the discussion above, one might be be tempted to take a weaker definition of the 4-4-2, say one traditional striker, one traditional winger, and a tendency to use one holding midfielder. Unfortunately, this definition fails to distinguish the 4-4-2 from the 4-2-3-1.
For example, Arsenal plays with one center-forward (van Persie), one traditional winger (Walcott or Gervinho), and one holding midfielder (Wilshere liking to attack). Similarly, Manchester City plays with one traditional center-forward (Dzeko); they have on occasion used Adam Johnson as a natural winger; and they can play with one holding midfielder: Milner loves to attack and Gareth Barry showed in the last match that he can do this as well.
Perhaps there is some way to draw a line between these 4-4-2s and 4-2-3-1s. For example, we could try to argue that Rooney is a striker even when he plays in midfield, and Yaya Toure is a midfielder even when he plays as a striker. But it seems to me that we are really splitting hairs at this point.
The reality is the 4-4-2s used by top teams are very similar to 4-2-3-1s. No top team plays a real 4-4-2 anymore. And the commentators who are calling for Manchester City to play a 4-4-2 simply don't know what they are talking about.
This annoyed me more than usual, though, because City clearly were playing more attacking football. They made 19 shots on goal in the first half alone. That they didn't score in the first half owed much to an incredible performance by Swansea's goalkeeper, Vorm, and more than a bit of luck.
This perplexed me as well because City were, at that moment, playing with only one holding midfielder, something that I at least associate with a 4-4-2.
This left me with some burning questions. What do they even mean by a 4-4-2? And why do they associate it so strongly with attacking football?
Below, I will do my best to try to answer these questions.
Is the 4-4-2 a more attacking formation than 4-2-3-1?
Clearly not. Just consider some of the other teams that play a 4-2-3-1:
- Arsenal: 72 goals, 2nd most goals in the EPL.
- Bayern Munich: 81 goals, top in the Bundesliga. They scored 14 more goals than Borussia Dortmund, the 2nd best scoring team (who also play 4-2-3-1, by the way).
- Real Madrid: 102 goals (!!), top in La Liga. They scored 7 more goals than Barcelona, the 2nd best scoring team.
These are all teams that play attacking football. Indeed, the criticism of both Arsenal and van Gaal's Bayern Munich has been that they are weak at the back. van Gaal's team was described as "recklessly" attacking. I suppose some might note Mourinho's penchant for defensive play, but Real Madrid demands an attacking team, and the statistics above speak for themselves.
What is the 4-4-2?
It's hard to come up with a precise definition of the 4-4-2. Indeed, coming up with precise definitions for even ordinary things is a lot more difficult than you might think. (What is a chair? It's something with four legs that you sit on. Ummm, that's also not a horse.)
Let me instead say that the 4-4-2 is a formation that often has with the following properties:
- Two strikers playing in the center-forward position.
- Two natural wingers. (As opposed to "inverted" wingers. A natural winger plays with his strong foot on the outside, which means he can hold the ball by the touchline and deliver crosses easily. An inverted winger plays with his strong foot on the inside, which means he can cut inside and shoot on goal easily.)
- Only one holding midfielder.
Of course, a given 4-4-2 need not have all of these properties. But actually, it's not clear that the 4-4-2, as played by the top teams, has any of these properties.
Does any top team play a 4-4-2?
Of the top teams in the top 4 leagues, only two write 4-4-2 on their teamsheet: Manchester United and Liverpool. Let's consider how well these properties apply to their 4-4-2 formations.
- Two center forwards ("two up front") is perhaps the most commonly associated feature of the 4-4-2. And yet, neither of these teams plays with two traditional center forwards.
Manchester United's Wayne Rooney is often called a "false nine". He has long spent much of his time between the lines, rather than up against the central defenders, but last season, he was often seen dropping even deeper, adding creativity to the midfield. Indeed, against bigger teams, he would often drop into midfield in order top prevent United from being overrun in that area of the pitch.
Liverpool's Luis Suarez is another non-traditional striker. Like Rooney, he drops deep, but Suarez also likes to move out wide, i.e., he likes to play everywhere except in the usual center-forward position.
- Neither of these teams play with two natural wingers.
Last weekend, Manchester United played Ashley Young as a natural winger but Nani (as usual) played inverted. Liverpool played Stewart Downing out side, but Jordan Henderson was moving inside.
- Both of these teams have played with two holding midfielders.
It may be the case that United have a general tendency to use one holding midfielder. (Indeed, this impression is the reason that 4-4-2 and "one holding" were associated in my mind.) However, United have used two holding midfielders against bigger teams. For example, they have played Carrick and Fletcher together.
United have also played Carrick and Anderson together, as well as Carrick and Scholes. These are all players that have been used as holding midfielders in recent times. Indeed, United have a large group of midfielders — Carrick, Fletcher, Anderson, Gibson, Scholes — none of whom seem to be great attackers. (Of course, Scholes was in the past, but he was widely described as being a defensive midfielder last season.)
Liverpool frequently played Lucas and Jay Spearing together against the bigger teams last season. Both are considered holding midfielders.
If Ferguson can play one center-forward, only one natural winger, two holding midfielders, and call it a 4-4-2, perhaps Mancini should write 4-4-2 on his teamsheet and play his usual formation just to get the commentators off his back.
Again, what is the 4-4-2?
Based on the discussion above, one might be be tempted to take a weaker definition of the 4-4-2, say one traditional striker, one traditional winger, and a tendency to use one holding midfielder. Unfortunately, this definition fails to distinguish the 4-4-2 from the 4-2-3-1.
For example, Arsenal plays with one center-forward (van Persie), one traditional winger (Walcott or Gervinho), and one holding midfielder (Wilshere liking to attack). Similarly, Manchester City plays with one traditional center-forward (Dzeko); they have on occasion used Adam Johnson as a natural winger; and they can play with one holding midfielder: Milner loves to attack and Gareth Barry showed in the last match that he can do this as well.
Perhaps there is some way to draw a line between these 4-4-2s and 4-2-3-1s. For example, we could try to argue that Rooney is a striker even when he plays in midfield, and Yaya Toure is a midfielder even when he plays as a striker. But it seems to me that we are really splitting hairs at this point.
The reality is the 4-4-2s used by top teams are very similar to 4-2-3-1s. No top team plays a real 4-4-2 anymore. And the commentators who are calling for Manchester City to play a 4-4-2 simply don't know what they are talking about.
Tuesday, August 16, 2011
Mancini Shows the Flexibility in His Tactical Approach
It is of course only one match, but I feel that I came away from this one with more insight into Mancini's tactical plans for this season.
Many have noted that Mancini appeared to have "loosened the reins" or "released the handbrake". There is something to that, which I'll come to shortly. However, more generally, my main takeaway from this match was that Mancini's tactical approach has more flexibility than many have suggested.
I'll start by talking about the first 60 minutes of the match, where all would agree that City were playing their usual formation. When Aguero was substituted, some changes occurred, which I'll talk about later on.
With that in mind, the following are the key points that caught my attention during the match.
As many are already aware, Mancini's usual formation, the 4-2-3-1, features two holding midfielders (the "2" part, just in front of the defenders). Many accused Mancini early on of playing with three holding midfielders, because of the presence of Yaya Toure. Hopefully, everyone is well aware now that this was not the case. Toure is used by Mancini as an attacking player, and his key goals in the FA cup demonstrate his importance in attack. (That said, he is a beast on the defensive end as well.)
Two holding midfielders is the usual, but in this match, we saw Mancini also happy to use only one holding midfielder. In particular, even though Mancini wrote the usual 4-2-3-1 on the team sheet, one of the "2" players, Gareth Barry, was given the green light to attack.
Indeed, we could see right from the starting whistle that Barry was going to be playing forward. First in defense:
Barry and Yaya Toure in line on the right. de Jong further back on the left.
and then in attack:
Barry, getting forward in attack, feeds the ball to Silva.
This continued throughout the first 60 minutes:
Barry moves up with the ball and feeds Silva.
Barry about to feed Silva again. Silva now playing center-forward.
Barry receives the ball on the left wing.
Barry runs forward of Toure and Silva.
Barry pushes forward with the ball.
Later on, when de Jong was substituted out (for Aguero), the two central midfielders were Yaya Toure and Gareth Barry. Here too, one was allowed to attack. But in this case, as both Toure and Barry are capable attackers (whereas de Jong seems to be defensive minded in general), they took it in turn to go forward. For example, here is Barry getting forward:
Barry shown top/center, making a forward run. (Note: goal now on the left side.)
Last week, during the Community Shield match, Barry's role was played by James Milner, who also had a license to get forward in attack. However, as I pointed out in my previous post, he seemed to go too far. Perhaps he was less astute than Barry about finding the times at which to get forward, but in any case, the result was that Milner and Yaya rarely were forward together, so instead of an extra attacker we got a Milner-for-Yaya swap.
In this match, Barry seemed to get the balance just right. As can be seen in the pictures, he was often forward at the same time as Toure, adding to the attack rather than subtracting from it.
I keep hearing commentators saying that Mancini needs two up front. Here again, he showed that he can do this within his same 4-2-3-1 by having one of the "3" midfielders push forward:
Yaya Toure and Dzeko up top.
Silva and Dzeko up top.
Yaya Toure and Dzeko up top again.
Or if Dzeko wants to move out of center, then two of the "3" midfielders can go up top:
Dzeko with the ball on the left side. Silva and Adam Johnson up top.
A midfielder moving along side Dzeko, up top, is only a special case of a more general trend we saw in this match: movement amongst the attacking players. Mancini has often spoken in the past about the need for more movement from these players. In this match, I would have to think he got what he wanted.
Dzeko in particular was all over the place. Here is Dzeko dropping deep:
Dzeko, in the center of the picture, asking for the ball.
Dzeko with the ball, deeper now than Silva.
Dzeko on the left:
Dzeko charges down the left side with the ball.
Dzeko lines up the left side.
Dzeko with the ball on the left side.
Dzeko with the ball on the left side again.
Dzeko on the right:
Dzeko with the ball on the right side.
Dzeko the attacking midfielder:
Dzeko with the ball, looking to feed Silva.
The other attacking players also had lots of movement. The pictures above show Johnson, Silva, and Toure all playing the center-forward. Here's another one:
Johnson and Toure attacking in the center.
But we also saw wide players dropping deeper or more central:
Johnson with the ball, central and deeper.
Silva dropping deeper in the center. He does this all the time....
We saw Yaya Toure moving out of his central position to play on the right side:
Yaya Toure receiving the ball on the right side.
Even Gareth Barry was seen attacking centrally and on either side, as we saw above.
In general, this was a wonderful display of fluid movement by all the attacking players. And I should think this is exactly the sort of movement Mancini has been asking for. This sort of movement poses dilemmas for defenders as they have to determine in each case whether to follow the attacking player (opening up space behind them) or let them go free. The more movement they have, the more likely they are to find space open up somewhere in a critical area.
Aside from fast breaks, it is still a fairly accurate statement to say that "width" in the form of crosses comes solely from the fullbacks in Mancini's system.
The term "width" also (at least to me) means having an outlet on the side(s) to pass the ball. Since this is a less dangerous area, defenses often leave space available there. And when the defense is pressing and bearing down on the central attackers with the ball, an attacker stationed out wide can be an easy place to send the ball to safety.
In this match, many commented on Johnson providing width, presumably in this sense (since he rarely crosses the ball). However, as we saw above, Dzeko also lined up to the left of the defenders on occasion. Yaya Toure moved out to the right. And Silva moved off to the left.
In the first half alone, City produced 19 shots on goal, 7 of them on target. And those numbers may not even include all shots that were blocked. City hit the post twice. Indeed, they had 8 chances where some commentators would have said they "should have scored". It required some amount of luck and an extraordinary performance from their goalkeeper for Swansea to keep City at bay for the 45 minutes.
The second half continued just as the first half ended. City produced more quality chances. Finally, one of them went in: when keeper Vorm palmed away Johnson's shot, Dzeko was waiting there to shove it into the back of the net.
A score of 1-0 at 60 minutes, in my view, was still flattering to the away team. City easily could have scored multiple goals by then.
When Sergio Aguero was substituted for de Jong at about 60 minutes, City changed to a 4-4-2 formation, according to the commentators. This gave us a brief look at another tactical approach by Mancini.
My impression, at this point, was that both Dzeko and Aguero would be playing as center-forwards. But this did not happen for the most part. Aguero mostly played deep:
Aguero playing deep, between Silva and Johnson, as in a 4-2-3-1.
Aguero deep, level with Silva. Barry making a run at the top.
As we saw above, Dzeko also played deep in the first half. And that continued here:
Dzeko drops deeper to pick up the ball. Aguero now up top.
Aguero also played out to the right (as Yaya did earlier):
Aguero moves to the right. Dzeko and Silva now up top.
There were very few moments when Dzeko and Aguero were both up front. One important such moment, though, was the 2nd goal: Richards sent a cross along the ground in front of goal, Dzeko and Aguero were both charging at goal, and Aguero poked it in at the back post. However, as we saw in the pictures above, Silva, Johnson, and Yaya Toure also played this role earlier, especially in this same situation (crosses along the ground on fast breaks).
Overall, it was hard for me to see exactly what the tactical differences were upon Aguerio's introduction. In addition to the fact that neither Dzeko nor Aguero was playing up top all that much, we also didn't get to see the new formation for very long.
At 74 minutes (less than 15 minutes after Aguero came on), Savic was substituted for Johnson. As a result, Clichy was moved up to midfield. Compared to Johnson, Clichy was very reluctant to get forward. So from that point, we had fewer attackers involved up front.
At 82 minutes (just over 20 minutes after Aguero came on), Milner was substituted for Silva. Now the two wide players were Clichy and Yaya Toure, both of whom were now playing out of position. Hence, I'm very reluctant to draw any conclusions from the last 10 minutes of the match.
On the basis of the three goals scored after Aguero came on, the Church of the 4-4-2 is declaring victory. Personally, I am not convinced, as you can see from my thinking above.
My overall impressions of the last 30 minutes are these:
All in all, that was a great performance by City's attacking players, particularly in the first 60 minutes, and a great performance by Sergio Aguero in the last 30.
It will be interesting to see how Mancini deploys his men in the upcoming matches. My best guess is that Mancini used a 4-4-2 this time because it would be most familiar to Aguero, and that in the next match, we'll see a 4-2-3-1 with Aguero playing in Yaya Toure's position. If that happens, I expect to see an incredible display by fluid attacking players. I also expect members of the Church of the 4-4-2 to groan and complain the whole time.
Many have noted that Mancini appeared to have "loosened the reins" or "released the handbrake". There is something to that, which I'll come to shortly. However, more generally, my main takeaway from this match was that Mancini's tactical approach has more flexibility than many have suggested.
I'll start by talking about the first 60 minutes of the match, where all would agree that City were playing their usual formation. When Aguero was substituted, some changes occurred, which I'll talk about later on.
With that in mind, the following are the key points that caught my attention during the match.
Holding Players
As many are already aware, Mancini's usual formation, the 4-2-3-1, features two holding midfielders (the "2" part, just in front of the defenders). Many accused Mancini early on of playing with three holding midfielders, because of the presence of Yaya Toure. Hopefully, everyone is well aware now that this was not the case. Toure is used by Mancini as an attacking player, and his key goals in the FA cup demonstrate his importance in attack. (That said, he is a beast on the defensive end as well.)
Two holding midfielders is the usual, but in this match, we saw Mancini also happy to use only one holding midfielder. In particular, even though Mancini wrote the usual 4-2-3-1 on the team sheet, one of the "2" players, Gareth Barry, was given the green light to attack.
Indeed, we could see right from the starting whistle that Barry was going to be playing forward. First in defense:
and then in attack:
This continued throughout the first 60 minutes:
Later on, when de Jong was substituted out (for Aguero), the two central midfielders were Yaya Toure and Gareth Barry. Here too, one was allowed to attack. But in this case, as both Toure and Barry are capable attackers (whereas de Jong seems to be defensive minded in general), they took it in turn to go forward. For example, here is Barry getting forward:
Last week, during the Community Shield match, Barry's role was played by James Milner, who also had a license to get forward in attack. However, as I pointed out in my previous post, he seemed to go too far. Perhaps he was less astute than Barry about finding the times at which to get forward, but in any case, the result was that Milner and Yaya rarely were forward together, so instead of an extra attacker we got a Milner-for-Yaya swap.
In this match, Barry seemed to get the balance just right. As can be seen in the pictures, he was often forward at the same time as Toure, adding to the attack rather than subtracting from it.
Players Up Front
I keep hearing commentators saying that Mancini needs two up front. Here again, he showed that he can do this within his same 4-2-3-1 by having one of the "3" midfielders push forward:
Or if Dzeko wants to move out of center, then two of the "3" midfielders can go up top:
Movement
A midfielder moving along side Dzeko, up top, is only a special case of a more general trend we saw in this match: movement amongst the attacking players. Mancini has often spoken in the past about the need for more movement from these players. In this match, I would have to think he got what he wanted.
Dzeko in particular was all over the place. Here is Dzeko dropping deep:
Dzeko on the left:
Dzeko on the right:
Dzeko the attacking midfielder:
The other attacking players also had lots of movement. The pictures above show Johnson, Silva, and Toure all playing the center-forward. Here's another one:
But we also saw wide players dropping deeper or more central:
We saw Yaya Toure moving out of his central position to play on the right side:
Even Gareth Barry was seen attacking centrally and on either side, as we saw above.
In general, this was a wonderful display of fluid movement by all the attacking players. And I should think this is exactly the sort of movement Mancini has been asking for. This sort of movement poses dilemmas for defenders as they have to determine in each case whether to follow the attacking player (opening up space behind them) or let them go free. The more movement they have, the more likely they are to find space open up somewhere in a critical area.
Width
Aside from fast breaks, it is still a fairly accurate statement to say that "width" in the form of crosses comes solely from the fullbacks in Mancini's system.
The term "width" also (at least to me) means having an outlet on the side(s) to pass the ball. Since this is a less dangerous area, defenses often leave space available there. And when the defense is pressing and bearing down on the central attackers with the ball, an attacker stationed out wide can be an easy place to send the ball to safety.
In this match, many commented on Johnson providing width, presumably in this sense (since he rarely crosses the ball). However, as we saw above, Dzeko also lined up to the left of the defenders on occasion. Yaya Toure moved out to the right. And Silva moved off to the left.
Overall Attacking Performance (In the First 60 Minutes)
In the first half alone, City produced 19 shots on goal, 7 of them on target. And those numbers may not even include all shots that were blocked. City hit the post twice. Indeed, they had 8 chances where some commentators would have said they "should have scored". It required some amount of luck and an extraordinary performance from their goalkeeper for Swansea to keep City at bay for the 45 minutes.
The second half continued just as the first half ended. City produced more quality chances. Finally, one of them went in: when keeper Vorm palmed away Johnson's shot, Dzeko was waiting there to shove it into the back of the net.
A score of 1-0 at 60 minutes, in my view, was still flattering to the away team. City easily could have scored multiple goals by then.
Aguero's Introduction
When Sergio Aguero was substituted for de Jong at about 60 minutes, City changed to a 4-4-2 formation, according to the commentators. This gave us a brief look at another tactical approach by Mancini.
My impression, at this point, was that both Dzeko and Aguero would be playing as center-forwards. But this did not happen for the most part. Aguero mostly played deep:
As we saw above, Dzeko also played deep in the first half. And that continued here:
Aguero also played out to the right (as Yaya did earlier):
There were very few moments when Dzeko and Aguero were both up front. One important such moment, though, was the 2nd goal: Richards sent a cross along the ground in front of goal, Dzeko and Aguero were both charging at goal, and Aguero poked it in at the back post. However, as we saw in the pictures above, Silva, Johnson, and Yaya Toure also played this role earlier, especially in this same situation (crosses along the ground on fast breaks).
Overall, it was hard for me to see exactly what the tactical differences were upon Aguerio's introduction. In addition to the fact that neither Dzeko nor Aguero was playing up top all that much, we also didn't get to see the new formation for very long.
At 74 minutes (less than 15 minutes after Aguero came on), Savic was substituted for Johnson. As a result, Clichy was moved up to midfield. Compared to Johnson, Clichy was very reluctant to get forward. So from that point, we had fewer attackers involved up front.
At 82 minutes (just over 20 minutes after Aguero came on), Milner was substituted for Silva. Now the two wide players were Clichy and Yaya Toure, both of whom were now playing out of position. Hence, I'm very reluctant to draw any conclusions from the last 10 minutes of the match.
On the basis of the three goals scored after Aguero came on, the Church of the 4-4-2 is declaring victory. Personally, I am not convinced, as you can see from my thinking above.
My overall impressions of the last 30 minutes are these:
- Aguero is a special player. The third goal didn't seem like a chance that was any better than the 8 created in the first half, and yet Aguero with a bit of luck and a lot of brilliance, created a goal out of it by kicking the ball over the keeper and then backward, behind him, to David Silva. The fourth goal similarly did not seem all that threatening. Toure, Silva, and Johnson all had shots from even closer in the first half, but Aguero's went in. Maybe this is just a fluke, but one gets the impression that he is a very special talent.
- Dzeko, Aguero, and Silva seemed to link up well. Dzeko and Aguero each tried to backheel to the other once. Neither worked, but one got the impression that, in a short time, it will start working.
- The other attacking players seemed a bit more reserved in the 4-4-2, perhaps due to its unfamiliarity. This is another reason I can't see why this formation made the team more attacking. In many cases, we had fewer attacking players.
- City were also helped by the fact that Swansea were getting worn down. Also, after the first goal, Swansea made substitutions that, according to the commentators, showed they were going for it, becoming even more attack minded. Pushing more players forward opened up more room at the back, which made it easier for City to score.
Conclusions
All in all, that was a great performance by City's attacking players, particularly in the first 60 minutes, and a great performance by Sergio Aguero in the last 30.
It will be interesting to see how Mancini deploys his men in the upcoming matches. My best guess is that Mancini used a 4-4-2 this time because it would be most familiar to Aguero, and that in the next match, we'll see a 4-2-3-1 with Aguero playing in Yaya Toure's position. If that happens, I expect to see an incredible display by fluid attacking players. I also expect members of the Church of the 4-4-2 to groan and complain the whole time.
Thursday, August 11, 2011
A Painless Review of the Community Shield (OR: Why I Blame Milner For City's Loss)
For Manchester City fans like myself with heightened expectations going into the new season, the loss of the Community Shield was extremely painful. For a while, I simply wanted to crawl back into bed and hope to wake up and find it was just a bad dream. But the better part of me knew the right thing to do is try understand what happened on the pitch and what City need to do to improve.
I finally gathered the strength to watch the Community Shield match again now, and I'm glad I did. I think I've finally made peace with what happened.
For those who have more effectively blocked the match from their memory, remember this: the score was 2-2 at 60 minutes. United and City played a relatively even match for the last 35 minutes. If anything, City was gaining strength as the game went on, and to my view, the final goal in injury time was against the run of play. Had it not been for that freak mistake by Kompany, I don't know that any of us would feel so poorly about our team.
Unlike the typical match, I think this one is better described as a game of three thirds rather than a game of two halves. Each third featured a different combination of formations and styles by the two teams. Much of what happened on the pitch is explainable in terms of these tactical match-ups.
This is of course not to say that United did not play better in general. United looked "sharper" in the sense that they completed more of their passes. City had an uncharacteristically large fraction of their passes go astray, particularly toward the beginning of the match.
However, I don't think that City fans should be overly worried about "sharpness". There are an awful lot of games to come, so City players will get plenty of time to find their touch and start to play together more fluidly.
Many commentators also talked about United's "higher intensity". However, I think this is misleading. What sticks out in your mind is United's high pressing (when City had the ball in their own third) and the speed of their counter-attacks. But this is just the usual United style against big teams. They played the same way against Barcelona, for example, as well as against City in the FA cup. Both times, they walked away empty handed. In short, I think this perceived "intensity" is simply style over substance.
Putting aside sharpness and intensity, the best way to understand what happened in this particular match is via tactics. Furthermore, while the sharpness and form of both teams will be different when these two teams meet again, the tactical questions will remain the same.
So let's look in more detail at what happened tactically in the match. Then let's look ahead at what City will need to do this season.
In the first third, this was much like a rematch of the FA Cup semifinal. United started strongly, while City grew into the match. While United had plenty of possession, they could not create dangerous chances. The reason for this was City's dominance in midfield.
City lined up in their usual 4-2-3-1:
and United in their usual 4-4-2:
In principle, this means City should have a 3 versus 2 (Yaya, Milner, de Jong v Carrick, Anderson) advantage in midfield, and that his indeed how it worked out.
City's dominance of midfield meant that United could only get forward by pushing out to the wings. Their two wingers (Young and Nani) would then send crosses into the box.
When City dominate midfield in this formation, this is often what happens. In other words, City expect teams to attack them in this way, via crosses from the wings. Because our two centerbacks (Lescott and Kompany) have so much protection in front of them, they can worry less about attacks from the front and focus more on attacks from the wings. The end result is that Lescott and Kompany eat these sorts of crosses for breakfast.
This is the reason that, even though United had most of the possession (due to City's poor passing), they weren't able to create many dangerous chances.
In that way, this part of the match followed along the same lines as the FA Cup semifinal. In that match, City dominated midfield and forced United out to the wings. City's defensive line-up prevented United from scoring, but made things a bit harder going forward. However, as the match went on, City got forward more, and in the end, the outcome was was settled by a single goal from Yaya Toure.
However, there was one difference between this line-up and that of the FA Cup semifinal: James Milner was playing in place of James Barry. This difference turned out to be an important one.
The key difference between these two players is that James Milner loves to get forward.
Indeed, he does it so much, you have to wonder whether he forgets what his position actually is. Sometimes he thinks he's the attacking midfielder:
Other times, he thinks he's a striker:
Now, in principle, I suppose we should be happy that Milner wants to attack. But when Milner wants to play out of position, that means some other positionally disciplined player will have to take over his role. In this case, that other player was Yaya Toure. So the effect of Milner pushing forward is that City had Milner attacking instead of Yaya Toure. And I'm not convinced that is such a good trade.
Yaya Toure is a uniquely talented player. He's one of the biggest and strongest players on the pitch. And surprisingly, he's also one of the fastest. Even in this match, on one occasion, he ran away from a smaller United player that anyone would guess was faster.
His combination of physical characteristics means that almost no one can get the ball away him. He provides an ideal target for moving the ball from defense into attack. As we saw in the FA Cup semifinal, he can score goals. And he can also defend extremely well. Indeed, given all of this, one has to wonder whether Mancini's best transfer purchase for City was not Yaya Toure.
With that in mind, is it a positive move to have Milner playing in Yaya Toure's role? I think not. But Milner's constant forward movement meant Yaya felt he had to stay back, so the Milner for Yaya swap was indeed what happened.
The middle third was also even, but much more open. City changed positions and United changed tactics. Both sides scored twice.
Milner's movement in the first part of the game created a dilemma for Mancini: what should he do about Milner playing in Yaya's role?
In the 36th minute, he decided the best option was to let Milner attack, but he needed to make sure that there was some creativity in central midfield as well. His decision was to move Milner onto the wing and move Silva centrally. So in effect, Silva was playing in Yaya's original role (attacking midfielder), Milner was in Silva's (wing), and Yaya was in Milner's (defensive midfielder).
For a time, this switch worked very well. Silva assisted the first goal and was involved in everything that was going on up front, including the second goal. Indeed, this appeared to be a very good move offensively.
Unfortunately, the outcome of matches is not determined solely by what your team does. The other team gets their say as well.
In the second half, Fergie's men changed tactics. He knew they were getting overrun in midfield, so he asked his four attacking players (Rooney, Wellbeck, Nani, and Young) to take turns dropping back into midfield. Each attacking player took a turn, though Rooney the most often.
Technically, this brought the midfield battle to 3 versus 3. However, this was also not the same 3 that City had used in the first half. In particular, Silva was now playing in Yaya's role. And while Silva does work hard in defense, he is not Yaya Toure.
United quickly started to get the upper hand in midfield, and they started to create chances through the middle. This finally started to create real danger for City.
United's first goal was nearly identical to City's first. Each was scored from a set piece, a free kick about 25 yards out and near the sideline. Both balls were floated into the box where a defender (Lescott and Smalling) managed to get free with the ball to score an easy goal.
United's second goal was rather different. It was scored right through the center, where United now had numbers. They had not only their 4 attacking players involved, but also Cleverly was able to get forward and bring a fifth body into the penalty area.
United should be given credit for what was a great goal. However, the tactical situation did not help City here. Silva's defensive responsibilities on the wing are different from those playing in central midfield. Indeed, the ball was played past Silva in the move that led to the goal, and one has to wonder whether the bigger faster Yaya Toure would have been able to do more to stop it.
Possibly worse than that, however, was the fact that Balotelli did not track back at all during that drive by United. Balotelli was on the wing, while United went mostly through the center, but Balotelli should have been closeby, which may have freed up other players to help stop United.
The final third was even and tight. City reverted to their original tactics, while United stuck with those that had worked in the second half. City grew stronger as the match went on, but both sides continued to create chances. Finally, a freak mistake by Kompany allowed the game winner.
Immediately after the second goal, Mancini changed again. He needed to get Yaya back into his attacking position, so he brought Gareth Barry in and withdrew an attacking player. The player he chose to remove was Balotelli, most likely because he had failed to track back just before. (Later on, he would also switch Milner for Johnson, but that was a like-for-like substitution that did not change the tactical situation.)
These changes immediately made City more solid defensively. Had United gone back to their first half tactics as well, we might well have seen a repeat of the FA Cup semifinal. However, United stuck with their new approach: attackers dropping into midfield to make it 3 versus 3. The result was an even match, where both sides were able to create chances.
Nonetheless, the remaining 30 minutes of regular time passed without a goal from either team. City grew into the game more and more, finally getting some sustained pressure on United in the final 10 minutes. But the match remained quite even and could well have gone either way. (Of course, you know what way it went.)
What can we learn from this about the remainder of City's season?
First off, as I said above, I think we don't need to worry about sharpness. That will come for City. Indeed, City already looked quite sharp against Intern Milan, and what seemed like a lack of sharpness here may have been more about giving too much respect to United.
Tactically, the big questions relate to how City will play in big matches:
Against smaller teams, we may well see Milner pushing forward or even a 4-4-2 formation. I'm sure that will produce some exciting football. But when City play against United, Chelsea, Arsenal, and other top teams, my best guess is that Yaya will continue to be the key player.
I finally gathered the strength to watch the Community Shield match again now, and I'm glad I did. I think I've finally made peace with what happened.
For those who have more effectively blocked the match from their memory, remember this: the score was 2-2 at 60 minutes. United and City played a relatively even match for the last 35 minutes. If anything, City was gaining strength as the game went on, and to my view, the final goal in injury time was against the run of play. Had it not been for that freak mistake by Kompany, I don't know that any of us would feel so poorly about our team.
A Game of Three Thirds
Unlike the typical match, I think this one is better described as a game of three thirds rather than a game of two halves. Each third featured a different combination of formations and styles by the two teams. Much of what happened on the pitch is explainable in terms of these tactical match-ups.
This is of course not to say that United did not play better in general. United looked "sharper" in the sense that they completed more of their passes. City had an uncharacteristically large fraction of their passes go astray, particularly toward the beginning of the match.
However, I don't think that City fans should be overly worried about "sharpness". There are an awful lot of games to come, so City players will get plenty of time to find their touch and start to play together more fluidly.
Many commentators also talked about United's "higher intensity". However, I think this is misleading. What sticks out in your mind is United's high pressing (when City had the ball in their own third) and the speed of their counter-attacks. But this is just the usual United style against big teams. They played the same way against Barcelona, for example, as well as against City in the FA cup. Both times, they walked away empty handed. In short, I think this perceived "intensity" is simply style over substance.
Putting aside sharpness and intensity, the best way to understand what happened in this particular match is via tactics. Furthermore, while the sharpness and form of both teams will be different when these two teams meet again, the tactical questions will remain the same.
So let's look in more detail at what happened tactically in the match. Then let's look ahead at what City will need to do this season.
First Third (0-0)
In the first third, this was much like a rematch of the FA Cup semifinal. United started strongly, while City grew into the match. While United had plenty of possession, they could not create dangerous chances. The reason for this was City's dominance in midfield.
City lined up in their usual 4-2-3-1:
and United in their usual 4-4-2:
In principle, this means City should have a 3 versus 2 (Yaya, Milner, de Jong v Carrick, Anderson) advantage in midfield, and that his indeed how it worked out.
City's dominance of midfield meant that United could only get forward by pushing out to the wings. Their two wingers (Young and Nani) would then send crosses into the box.
When City dominate midfield in this formation, this is often what happens. In other words, City expect teams to attack them in this way, via crosses from the wings. Because our two centerbacks (Lescott and Kompany) have so much protection in front of them, they can worry less about attacks from the front and focus more on attacks from the wings. The end result is that Lescott and Kompany eat these sorts of crosses for breakfast.
This is the reason that, even though United had most of the possession (due to City's poor passing), they weren't able to create many dangerous chances.
In that way, this part of the match followed along the same lines as the FA Cup semifinal. In that match, City dominated midfield and forced United out to the wings. City's defensive line-up prevented United from scoring, but made things a bit harder going forward. However, as the match went on, City got forward more, and in the end, the outcome was was settled by a single goal from Yaya Toure.
However, there was one difference between this line-up and that of the FA Cup semifinal: James Milner was playing in place of James Barry. This difference turned out to be an important one.
The key difference between these two players is that James Milner loves to get forward.
Indeed, he does it so much, you have to wonder whether he forgets what his position actually is. Sometimes he thinks he's the attacking midfielder:
Other times, he thinks he's a striker:
Now, in principle, I suppose we should be happy that Milner wants to attack. But when Milner wants to play out of position, that means some other positionally disciplined player will have to take over his role. In this case, that other player was Yaya Toure. So the effect of Milner pushing forward is that City had Milner attacking instead of Yaya Toure. And I'm not convinced that is such a good trade.
Yaya Toure is a uniquely talented player. He's one of the biggest and strongest players on the pitch. And surprisingly, he's also one of the fastest. Even in this match, on one occasion, he ran away from a smaller United player that anyone would guess was faster.
His combination of physical characteristics means that almost no one can get the ball away him. He provides an ideal target for moving the ball from defense into attack. As we saw in the FA Cup semifinal, he can score goals. And he can also defend extremely well. Indeed, given all of this, one has to wonder whether Mancini's best transfer purchase for City was not Yaya Toure.
With that in mind, is it a positive move to have Milner playing in Yaya Toure's role? I think not. But Milner's constant forward movement meant Yaya felt he had to stay back, so the Milner for Yaya swap was indeed what happened.
Second Third (2-2)
The middle third was also even, but much more open. City changed positions and United changed tactics. Both sides scored twice.
Milner's movement in the first part of the game created a dilemma for Mancini: what should he do about Milner playing in Yaya's role?
In the 36th minute, he decided the best option was to let Milner attack, but he needed to make sure that there was some creativity in central midfield as well. His decision was to move Milner onto the wing and move Silva centrally. So in effect, Silva was playing in Yaya's original role (attacking midfielder), Milner was in Silva's (wing), and Yaya was in Milner's (defensive midfielder).
For a time, this switch worked very well. Silva assisted the first goal and was involved in everything that was going on up front, including the second goal. Indeed, this appeared to be a very good move offensively.
Unfortunately, the outcome of matches is not determined solely by what your team does. The other team gets their say as well.
In the second half, Fergie's men changed tactics. He knew they were getting overrun in midfield, so he asked his four attacking players (Rooney, Wellbeck, Nani, and Young) to take turns dropping back into midfield. Each attacking player took a turn, though Rooney the most often.
Technically, this brought the midfield battle to 3 versus 3. However, this was also not the same 3 that City had used in the first half. In particular, Silva was now playing in Yaya's role. And while Silva does work hard in defense, he is not Yaya Toure.
United quickly started to get the upper hand in midfield, and they started to create chances through the middle. This finally started to create real danger for City.
United's first goal was nearly identical to City's first. Each was scored from a set piece, a free kick about 25 yards out and near the sideline. Both balls were floated into the box where a defender (Lescott and Smalling) managed to get free with the ball to score an easy goal.
United's second goal was rather different. It was scored right through the center, where United now had numbers. They had not only their 4 attacking players involved, but also Cleverly was able to get forward and bring a fifth body into the penalty area.
United should be given credit for what was a great goal. However, the tactical situation did not help City here. Silva's defensive responsibilities on the wing are different from those playing in central midfield. Indeed, the ball was played past Silva in the move that led to the goal, and one has to wonder whether the bigger faster Yaya Toure would have been able to do more to stop it.
Possibly worse than that, however, was the fact that Balotelli did not track back at all during that drive by United. Balotelli was on the wing, while United went mostly through the center, but Balotelli should have been closeby, which may have freed up other players to help stop United.
Final Third (0-1)
The final third was even and tight. City reverted to their original tactics, while United stuck with those that had worked in the second half. City grew stronger as the match went on, but both sides continued to create chances. Finally, a freak mistake by Kompany allowed the game winner.
Immediately after the second goal, Mancini changed again. He needed to get Yaya back into his attacking position, so he brought Gareth Barry in and withdrew an attacking player. The player he chose to remove was Balotelli, most likely because he had failed to track back just before. (Later on, he would also switch Milner for Johnson, but that was a like-for-like substitution that did not change the tactical situation.)
These changes immediately made City more solid defensively. Had United gone back to their first half tactics as well, we might well have seen a repeat of the FA Cup semifinal. However, United stuck with their new approach: attackers dropping into midfield to make it 3 versus 3. The result was an even match, where both sides were able to create chances.
Nonetheless, the remaining 30 minutes of regular time passed without a goal from either team. City grew into the game more and more, finally getting some sustained pressure on United in the final 10 minutes. But the match remained quite even and could well have gone either way. (Of course, you know what way it went.)
What the Future Holds
What can we learn from this about the remainder of City's season?
First off, as I said above, I think we don't need to worry about sharpness. That will come for City. Indeed, City already looked quite sharp against Intern Milan, and what seemed like a lack of sharpness here may have been more about giving too much respect to United.
Tactically, the big questions relate to how City will play in big matches:
- Can James Milner stay defensively disciplined and curb his enthusiasm for getting forward? If not, then I don't expect him to play against big teams. This Milner for Yaya switch did not work well and does not seem like a good idea in any case.
- Can Silva or Nasri or Aguero play in Yaya's role? At this point, I would have to think the answer is no. Silva was not the same defensive force as Yaya, and I see no reason to think that Nasri or Aguero would do any better. Yaya is unique, and we need him in this position for these matches.
Against smaller teams, we may well see Milner pushing forward or even a 4-4-2 formation. I'm sure that will produce some exciting football. But when City play against United, Chelsea, Arsenal, and other top teams, my best guess is that Yaya will continue to be the key player.
Tuesday, August 2, 2011
Does Saying No to Racism Mean Saying No to FFP?
One of the interesting trends during the summer transfer window has been Liverpool's apparent interest in signing British players. Actually, not just signing them but (it would seem) overpaying for British players. A recent joke sums it up well: "Joey Barton has been released on a free. Liverpool have submitted a £30m bid."
Now, I have no idea why Liverpool has signed these players. Maybe it has nothing to do with their being British. Maybe these are just a players that Liverpool thinks have some talent others have missed.
I don't want to speculate about what Dalgish and Comolli are thinking. But Liverpool's buying does raise an interesting hypothetical: what if some team (not Liverpool) thought that they could make more money by signing white players? What if they thought they could sell more jerseys with more white players on the team?
This hypothetical does not worry me too much under normal conditions because I actually don't think the purpose of a football club is to make money. The purpose of a football club is to win trophies.
Indeed, despite how much some fans complain about clubs that spend a lot in order to win (e.g. Chelsea, Man City), fans also have unbridled scorn for clubs that actually try to make money rather than trying to win. The fact that Newcastle has not (yet) spent the money gained from selling Andy Carroll and Kevin Nolan to buy new players has rightfully been pilloried. Arsenal has also not been spending, and if they do not spend by the end of the summer (especially if they sell Cesc and or Nasri), I would similarly expect outrage.
Owners that want to win — either instinctively or because fans hold their feet to the fire — should not display the sort of racism described above. If a black player is better than a white player, the owner who wants to win will sign the black player, even if that does mean selling fewer jerseys.
At least, they would have in years past. But what about today?
With financial fair play (FFP), the situation is not so nice. If the white player will sell more jerseys, then he is effectively cheaper under FFP rules because the jersey sales cancel out some of the fees and wages of the player. Hence, FFP may be creating a situation where the game is systematically biased in favor of white players.
To those who think there is no alternative but to adopt FFP, I would point out that that this argument does not apply to salary caps, like those used in the NFL and NBA, because the limits are applied only to wages not to the total revenues of the club (which includes jersey sales).
Is this scenario described (of systematic bias in favor of white players) likely to arise in the EPL? Hopefully not. But the fact that FFP would seem to incentivize racism adds to the list of problems with FFP that others have pointed out. Unlike a salary cap, it is anti-competitive: it makes it harder for teams lower in standing now to move up. It may even be anti-competitive in a legal sense, i.e., it might be illegal.
Above all, this gives yet one more counter-argument to claims that FFP is necessary to save football. FFP creates many new problems, ones that comparable approaches in other sports (like salary caps) do not have. Hopefully, UEFA will come to their senses and look at salary caps instead, but don't hold your breath.
Update: Some may not like the alternative of a salary cap (perhaps because they don't want the league to be "that equal"). However, salary caps are not the only alternative. Another is a "luxury tax" like that used in the MLB.
In this system, there is a limit on salary but it is not a hard limit. Clubs can spend more than the limit, but the league charges them a tax on this excess amount and (I think) distributes the money to the other teams. This allows clubs in major cities to retain some advantage. However, the luxury tax also does not have the problem of incentivizing racism. It is still in the best interest of every club to pick the best players regardless of race, just as with a salary cap.
Now, I have no idea why Liverpool has signed these players. Maybe it has nothing to do with their being British. Maybe these are just a players that Liverpool thinks have some talent others have missed.
I don't want to speculate about what Dalgish and Comolli are thinking. But Liverpool's buying does raise an interesting hypothetical: what if some team (not Liverpool) thought that they could make more money by signing white players? What if they thought they could sell more jerseys with more white players on the team?
This hypothetical does not worry me too much under normal conditions because I actually don't think the purpose of a football club is to make money. The purpose of a football club is to win trophies.
Indeed, despite how much some fans complain about clubs that spend a lot in order to win (e.g. Chelsea, Man City), fans also have unbridled scorn for clubs that actually try to make money rather than trying to win. The fact that Newcastle has not (yet) spent the money gained from selling Andy Carroll and Kevin Nolan to buy new players has rightfully been pilloried. Arsenal has also not been spending, and if they do not spend by the end of the summer (especially if they sell Cesc and or Nasri), I would similarly expect outrage.
Owners that want to win — either instinctively or because fans hold their feet to the fire — should not display the sort of racism described above. If a black player is better than a white player, the owner who wants to win will sign the black player, even if that does mean selling fewer jerseys.
At least, they would have in years past. But what about today?
With financial fair play (FFP), the situation is not so nice. If the white player will sell more jerseys, then he is effectively cheaper under FFP rules because the jersey sales cancel out some of the fees and wages of the player. Hence, FFP may be creating a situation where the game is systematically biased in favor of white players.
To those who think there is no alternative but to adopt FFP, I would point out that that this argument does not apply to salary caps, like those used in the NFL and NBA, because the limits are applied only to wages not to the total revenues of the club (which includes jersey sales).
Is this scenario described (of systematic bias in favor of white players) likely to arise in the EPL? Hopefully not. But the fact that FFP would seem to incentivize racism adds to the list of problems with FFP that others have pointed out. Unlike a salary cap, it is anti-competitive: it makes it harder for teams lower in standing now to move up. It may even be anti-competitive in a legal sense, i.e., it might be illegal.
Above all, this gives yet one more counter-argument to claims that FFP is necessary to save football. FFP creates many new problems, ones that comparable approaches in other sports (like salary caps) do not have. Hopefully, UEFA will come to their senses and look at salary caps instead, but don't hold your breath.
Update: Some may not like the alternative of a salary cap (perhaps because they don't want the league to be "that equal"). However, salary caps are not the only alternative. Another is a "luxury tax" like that used in the MLB.
In this system, there is a limit on salary but it is not a hard limit. Clubs can spend more than the limit, but the league charges them a tax on this excess amount and (I think) distributes the money to the other teams. This allows clubs in major cities to retain some advantage. However, the luxury tax also does not have the problem of incentivizing racism. It is still in the best interest of every club to pick the best players regardless of race, just as with a salary cap.
Saturday, May 14, 2011
More on Mancini's Project
As I wrote once before, I have the impression that Roberto Mancini is in large part modeling his team on Arsenal. (His version though is an Arsenal with muscle.) Hence, my ears perked up in response to Mancini's recent quotes on certain Arsenal players.
Mancini was asked what player he would need to add to his team to win the English Premier League title. Mancini had just been discussing Zlatan Ibrahimovic, but Zlatan was not his answer. His answer was Cesc Fabregas.
While Man City and Arsenal play the same formation (4-2-3-1) and have attacking players with obvious similarities — Edin Dzeko is much like Robin van Persie, David Silva and Mario Balotelli are much like Samir Nasri and Theo Walcott — Man City has no one quite like Cesc Fabregas.
In my previous post, I compared David Silva to Cesc Fabregas. But as great as Silva is, Fabregas is at another level. In particular, Silva has much of the same creativity and ability to set up other players, but he is not the same scoring threat. Today, in the FA cup final, Mancini instead played Tevez in the Fabregas role. Clearly, Tevez has the same scoring ability (if not more), but he has not shown the same ability to set up other players. In short, no current Man City player is perfect for this position, the middle of the 3 in Mancini's 4-2-3-1.
The evidence suggests that finding a player for this position is Mancini's #1 priority this summer. Most of the top players linked with the club already — Kaka, Wesley Sneijder, Javier Pastore, and now Cesc Fabregas — play best in exactly this role. Of all these players, Cesc certainly has the advantage of being already adjusted both to the English league and to Mancini's formation. Perhaps that is why Mancini stated he would like Fabregas the most.
If things play out this way, then here is the lineup we might be looking at next fall:
It may seem odd that I have left out Tevez from this formation. This is for two reasons. First, he continues to look likely to leave this summer. Second, with Dzeko's obvious similarities to van Persie (including his aerial threat, which Tevez lacks), it seems likely that Mancini has him in mind to lead the line long term.
Others might question playing Balottelli routinely in a wide position. However, he showed today that he can be very effective in this role. He can run onto a diagonal ball over the defense as well as Theo Walcott or Valencia. He can hold up the ball for other players just as well. And he can even come inside and shoot as well as Nani or Nasri. For my money, Balotelli would perhaps be the most potent wide attacking threat in the league next year.
Indeed, I imagine that the four attacking players in this lineup could easily form the most potent attack in the league next season. If Dzeko returns to his Wolfsberg form, he is as dangerous as van Persie. Fabregas is probably the most dangerous central midfielder in the league today. As I just argued, Balotelli would likely be the most dangerous wide threat. And with Fabreagas able to provide creativity, Silva could easily be as prodigious a goal scorer next season as Samir Nasri was playing next to Fabregas this season.
To me, the two holding midfielders in this formation are without doubt the best in the league. I think few would doubt that de Jong is currently the best single holding midfielder. Yaya Toure is also accomplished at this role. But as we saw this season, Yaya is also an attacking threat. In fact, his run from a holding position scored the winning goal in the FA cup final today. This combination of attacking and solid-as-steel defending could not be matched.
The defense has been the primary strength this season, as City have the second best rated defense. Kompany, Hart, and Richards are all in contention for league best in their position. If there are any weaknesses here they are in Kompany's defensive partner, which has been both Kolo Toure and Joleon Lescott this year, and at left back, which has featured Pablo Zabaletta and Aleksandar Kolarov.
If I had to pick just one of those two positions to shore up this summer, like Gabriele Marcotti, I would take another central defender. At left back, we have both Zabaletta, who has delivered when needed this season, and Kolarov who has continue to improve defensively. Indeed, Kolarov's attacking threat would be extremely valuable (particularly in a 4-2-3-1) provided that he can deliver on defensive end. (Also keep in mind, that the best team in the world today, Barcelona, make do rotating a few different left backs.)
News reports suggest that this is what Mancini plans to do. The ones I have read suggested he plans to sign Ajax central defender Vertonghen. So I have included him in the lineup above.
Clearly, this defense, from Hart through Toure and de Jong, would be in the running for best in the league next season. In fact, one could easily see this defense as one of the best in the Champions League as well. Indeed, assuming Dzeko can return to form, one can easily see Man City with both the attacking threat and the defense needed to challenge in Europe.
Mancini was asked what player he would need to add to his team to win the English Premier League title. Mancini had just been discussing Zlatan Ibrahimovic, but Zlatan was not his answer. His answer was Cesc Fabregas.
While Man City and Arsenal play the same formation (4-2-3-1) and have attacking players with obvious similarities — Edin Dzeko is much like Robin van Persie, David Silva and Mario Balotelli are much like Samir Nasri and Theo Walcott — Man City has no one quite like Cesc Fabregas.
In my previous post, I compared David Silva to Cesc Fabregas. But as great as Silva is, Fabregas is at another level. In particular, Silva has much of the same creativity and ability to set up other players, but he is not the same scoring threat. Today, in the FA cup final, Mancini instead played Tevez in the Fabregas role. Clearly, Tevez has the same scoring ability (if not more), but he has not shown the same ability to set up other players. In short, no current Man City player is perfect for this position, the middle of the 3 in Mancini's 4-2-3-1.
The evidence suggests that finding a player for this position is Mancini's #1 priority this summer. Most of the top players linked with the club already — Kaka, Wesley Sneijder, Javier Pastore, and now Cesc Fabregas — play best in exactly this role. Of all these players, Cesc certainly has the advantage of being already adjusted both to the English league and to Mancini's formation. Perhaps that is why Mancini stated he would like Fabregas the most.
If things play out this way, then here is the lineup we might be looking at next fall:
It may seem odd that I have left out Tevez from this formation. This is for two reasons. First, he continues to look likely to leave this summer. Second, with Dzeko's obvious similarities to van Persie (including his aerial threat, which Tevez lacks), it seems likely that Mancini has him in mind to lead the line long term.
Others might question playing Balottelli routinely in a wide position. However, he showed today that he can be very effective in this role. He can run onto a diagonal ball over the defense as well as Theo Walcott or Valencia. He can hold up the ball for other players just as well. And he can even come inside and shoot as well as Nani or Nasri. For my money, Balotelli would perhaps be the most potent wide attacking threat in the league next year.
Indeed, I imagine that the four attacking players in this lineup could easily form the most potent attack in the league next season. If Dzeko returns to his Wolfsberg form, he is as dangerous as van Persie. Fabregas is probably the most dangerous central midfielder in the league today. As I just argued, Balotelli would likely be the most dangerous wide threat. And with Fabreagas able to provide creativity, Silva could easily be as prodigious a goal scorer next season as Samir Nasri was playing next to Fabregas this season.
To me, the two holding midfielders in this formation are without doubt the best in the league. I think few would doubt that de Jong is currently the best single holding midfielder. Yaya Toure is also accomplished at this role. But as we saw this season, Yaya is also an attacking threat. In fact, his run from a holding position scored the winning goal in the FA cup final today. This combination of attacking and solid-as-steel defending could not be matched.
The defense has been the primary strength this season, as City have the second best rated defense. Kompany, Hart, and Richards are all in contention for league best in their position. If there are any weaknesses here they are in Kompany's defensive partner, which has been both Kolo Toure and Joleon Lescott this year, and at left back, which has featured Pablo Zabaletta and Aleksandar Kolarov.
If I had to pick just one of those two positions to shore up this summer, like Gabriele Marcotti, I would take another central defender. At left back, we have both Zabaletta, who has delivered when needed this season, and Kolarov who has continue to improve defensively. Indeed, Kolarov's attacking threat would be extremely valuable (particularly in a 4-2-3-1) provided that he can deliver on defensive end. (Also keep in mind, that the best team in the world today, Barcelona, make do rotating a few different left backs.)
News reports suggest that this is what Mancini plans to do. The ones I have read suggested he plans to sign Ajax central defender Vertonghen. So I have included him in the lineup above.
Clearly, this defense, from Hart through Toure and de Jong, would be in the running for best in the league next season. In fact, one could easily see this defense as one of the best in the Champions League as well. Indeed, assuming Dzeko can return to form, one can easily see Man City with both the attacking threat and the defense needed to challenge in Europe.
Friday, May 6, 2011
Three Things I've Learned Playing Fantasy Football
One great thing about fantasy football is that it keeps you focused on what actually happens on the pitch (goals, assists, clean sheets) rather than overall impressions. It's not that impressions are irrelevant — they're not. But sometimes impressions are wrong. And by keeping you focused on what actually happened, fantasy football leaves you in a better place to spot wrong impressions.
Here are three wrong impressions I have spotted, based on experience playing fantasy football.
One final surprising thing I noticed from this measure of performance: Leighton Baines ranks #1 for Everton, ahead of both Tim Cahill and Louis Saha. That's pretty darn impressive for a fullback!
Here are three wrong impressions I have spotted, based on experience playing fantasy football.
- Hard working but unflashy players are often underrated. Examples: Dirk Kuyt and Andrei Arshavin.
Both Kuyt and Arshavin get described as players that aren't good enough for the teams that they are on. Whenever I hear this, I get very annoyed because I know from experience that both players deliver points.
Analyzing this is a bit tricky because players on better teams should provide more fantasy points (because those teams score more and have more clean sheets). One way to put things on the level though is to divide by the number of goals scored by the team.
Specifically, let's look at the following: how many points does a player earn for each goal scored by the team. This is a measure of how important that player is to the team in scoring goals. (Recall that a player can get points either for goals or assists. Assists count for 2 points while goals count for 4-6 points, depending on position.)
Here's what we discover. Over the last 15 weeks of the EPL season, Dirt Kuyt is #1 amongst Liverpool players in terms of fantasy points per goal in games he has played. He ranks higher than Gerrard, Suarez, Carroll, Meireles, you name it.
You might complain that these stats are skewed by the fact that Kuyt scored a hat trick a few weeks ago. Okay, suppose we remove Kuyt's hat trick all together. Guess what? He's still #1.
No one will be surprised to learn that the highest ranking Arsenal player according to this measure is Robin van Persie. He is a goal scoring machine. But who ranks #2? Is it Fabregas or Nasri or Walcott? Nope. It's Andrei Arshavin. In addition to the 3 goals he has scored when in the starting lineup, he also has 3 assists.
Another surprise in these results occurs at Tottenham. Again, the #1 ranked player is easy to guess: Rafael van der Vaart. But #2 is Pavlyuchenko, another underrated player. He ranks ahead of Crouch, Bale, and Lennon. In fact, he delivers twice as many fantasy points per goal as Bale, when each is in the starting lineup. - Pundits are overly eager to declare careers over. Example: Frank Lampard.
When a team is doing poorly, pundits seem overeager to declare the team in need of rebuilding. And it seems like the first thing they call for is removal of the older players who are stars of years past.
The primary example of this is Frank Lampard. I have listened to Tommy Smyth call for Chelsea to be rebuilt and Lampard tossed out on more than one occasion. Meanwhile, I pick him for my fantasy team nearly every week.
Why is that? It is because Lampard ranks #1 in fantasy points per goal amongst Chelsea players. In fact, he delivers nearly 75% more points per goal than Drogba who is apparently "in form" once again at this moment.
With all due respect, Tommy, Lampard should not be tossed out when he is the highest contributing Chelsea player in attack. To do so would be ridiculous.
Another player who gets similar treatment is Roma's Francisco Totti. Tommy says it's time for him to step aside.
I can't say much to this since I don't play Serie A fantasy football, but it does seem that Totti has been contributing quite a lot this year. Indeed, he leads Roma in both goals and assists. - Torres and Drogba can play together.
The pundits also tell me that Ancelotti needs to give up trying to play both Torres and Drogba. These two cannot play together, they say, and since Drogba is in form, he should play while Torres sits.
Yet from playing fantasy football last week, one statistic stands out to me: Drogba, playing on the wing, assisted in both goals. No player in the last 15 games has had 3 assists in one game, and only 10 other players that start on a regular basis have managed 2 in one game. Those players include Leighton Baines, Nani, Giggs, Rooney, and Arshavin — all players that are very effective in supporting roles. Clearly, Drogba is not ineffective on the wing.
Contrary to the pundits, I think Torres and Drogba are likely to both start for Chelsea in the remaining matches, including the match this weekend at Manchester United.
One final surprising thing I noticed from this measure of performance: Leighton Baines ranks #1 for Everton, ahead of both Tim Cahill and Louis Saha. That's pretty darn impressive for a fullback!
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Stewart Robson on Defense
During the latest "The Game" podcast, Stewart Robson, an ex-Arsenal player himself, commented on the current Arsenal squad's defensive failures:
Cheers, Stewart!
You don't deserve to win anything if you don't work hard enough at your set pieces and your defensive gameplan.
Cheers, Stewart!
Thursday, April 21, 2011
EPL Week 34 Fantasy Team
Now that I've moved to a fully automated system for picking a fantasy team, I need to rethink what information would prove most valuable to other people. I can no longer report my own reasoning behind choosing the team since I'm not doing any reasoning.
Essentially, choosing a team has two parts. First, you need to guess how many points each player will earn. Second, you need to figure out how to fit the most expected points into one team.
To help with the first part, here are my top 15 players by expected number of points:
This list is not perfect, of course, and you should apply your own judgement as well. As one example, Kyrgiakos is unlikely to play, even though he is neither injured nor suspended. Dalglish just hasn't been picking him recently. As another example, this is based on results from weeks 20 through 32. But perhaps you think a player is doing much better now than they were on average over that period. In that case, you may rate them higher.
As for finding the best way to fit players into your team, I have no useful advice. I let my computer figure out the team with the maximum number of expected points. However, for your reference, here is the team it chose:
Essentially, choosing a team has two parts. First, you need to guess how many points each player will earn. Second, you need to figure out how to fit the most expected points into one team.
To help with the first part, here are my top 15 players by expected number of points:
- 5.845 — J. Terry (CHE)
- 5.624 — K. Richardson (SUN)
- 5.525 — W. Rooney (MAU)
- 5.456 — R. van Persie (ARS)
- 5.226 — Nani (MAU)
- 4.863 — R. Meireles (LIV)
- 4.862 — B. Ivanovic (CHE)
- 4.689 — P. Bardsley (SUN)
- 4.668 — F. Lampard (CHE)
- 4.452 — S. Kyrgiakos (LIV)
- 4.412 — M. Skrtel (LIV)
- 4.247 — F. Malouda (CHE)
- 4.234 — R. Van der Vaart (TOT)
- 4.206 — R. Giggs (MAU)
- 4.175 — D. Campbell (BPL)
This list is not perfect, of course, and you should apply your own judgement as well. As one example, Kyrgiakos is unlikely to play, even though he is neither injured nor suspended. Dalglish just hasn't been picking him recently. As another example, this is based on results from weeks 20 through 32. But perhaps you think a player is doing much better now than they were on average over that period. In that case, you may rate them higher.
As for finding the best way to fit players into your team, I have no useful advice. I let my computer figure out the team with the maximum number of expected points. However, for your reference, here is the team it chose:
- Forwards: W. Rooney (MAU), R. van Persie (ARS), D. Campbell (BPL)
- Midfielders: Nani (MAU), R. Meireles (LIV), R. van der Vaart (TOT)
- Defenders: J. Terry (CHE, captain), B. Ivanovic (CHE), K. Richardson (SUN), P. Bardsley (SUN)
- Goalkeeper: P. Reina (LIV)
Friday, April 15, 2011
EPL Week 33 Fantasy Team
I finally got around this week to automating the rest of my fantasy team selection process.
Previously, I had been using my goal predictions to determine which teams were most likely to score or have clean sheets. Then I would try to find the best way of packing the best players from those teams into a lineup.
This approach has one particular problem. When deciding whether to start Tevez or van Persie, for example, I would know only the expected number of goals for each team and the average number of points per game for each of these players. It's not obvious how you would use those two numbers, though, to estimate the expected number of points for each player because I don't know whether this week's expected number of goals is more or less than usual for that player. I also don't know, if the expected number of goals is different this week, how many more points that should translate into.
However, I now have all the information necessary to do this the right way. What I really want to know is the expected number of points for a given player. This is just 2 plus [probability of a clean sheet] times [clean sheet points for that player] plus [expected number of goals] times [points per team goal for that player]. (All other sources of points amount to less than half a point per match, on average, so it's fairly safe to ignore.) I computed that last part, which tells me how many points the player should get for each goal scored by the team, from the official statistics of each player over the last 12 weeks.
Putting that all together, I get a list of all the players and their expected number of fantasy points this week.
All that remains is to figure out the best way to put them into a lineup. This is a simple exercise in search. For those interested, I used a branch-and-bound approach where the upper-bound comes from ignoring the team constraint (only 2 players per team) and simply taking the best players at each position.
Surprisingly, the resulting algorithm takes very little time to run, just a few seconds. I computed the best lineups in each of the allowed formations.
This week, I get the following 4-3-3:
Not too many surprises there, I suppose, except for the players from Birmingham. Still, I expect that this more analytical approach will pay off in the coming weeks. At least, it will save me some time.
Update: It turns out that Kevin Nolan is suspended, so I needed to do this again.
I added more data from some teams less likely to score goals and was surprised to see some were picked. In particular, Charlie Adam is a fantasy team gem. Even though Blackpool aren't as likely to score as some other teams, Adam's share of every goal is so high that it cancels that out.
The new team put Adam in for Nolan and DJ Campbell in for Zigic. It also picked Seamus Coleman. However, I remain worried that he will not be available for tomorrow's match. (He is currently recovering from injury.)
Once I listed him as still injured, a different formation gave the best results. In particular, I get the following 3-5-2:
Previously, I had been using my goal predictions to determine which teams were most likely to score or have clean sheets. Then I would try to find the best way of packing the best players from those teams into a lineup.
This approach has one particular problem. When deciding whether to start Tevez or van Persie, for example, I would know only the expected number of goals for each team and the average number of points per game for each of these players. It's not obvious how you would use those two numbers, though, to estimate the expected number of points for each player because I don't know whether this week's expected number of goals is more or less than usual for that player. I also don't know, if the expected number of goals is different this week, how many more points that should translate into.
However, I now have all the information necessary to do this the right way. What I really want to know is the expected number of points for a given player. This is just 2 plus [probability of a clean sheet] times [clean sheet points for that player] plus [expected number of goals] times [points per team goal for that player]. (All other sources of points amount to less than half a point per match, on average, so it's fairly safe to ignore.) I computed that last part, which tells me how many points the player should get for each goal scored by the team, from the official statistics of each player over the last 12 weeks.
Putting that all together, I get a list of all the players and their expected number of fantasy points this week.
All that remains is to figure out the best way to put them into a lineup. This is a simple exercise in search. For those interested, I used a branch-and-bound approach where the upper-bound comes from ignoring the team constraint (only 2 players per team) and simply taking the best players at each position.
Surprisingly, the resulting algorithm takes very little time to run, just a few seconds. I computed the best lineups in each of the allowed formations.
This week, I get the following 4-3-3:
- Forwards: R. van Persie (ARS), W. Rooney (MAU), N. Zigic (BIR)
- Midfielders: F. Lampard (CHE), Nani (MAU), K. Nolan (NEW)
- Defenders: J. Terry (CHE), L. Baines (EVE), P. Bardsley (SUN), K. Richardson (SUN)
- Keeper: B. Foster (BIR)
Not too many surprises there, I suppose, except for the players from Birmingham. Still, I expect that this more analytical approach will pay off in the coming weeks. At least, it will save me some time.
Update: It turns out that Kevin Nolan is suspended, so I needed to do this again.
I added more data from some teams less likely to score goals and was surprised to see some were picked. In particular, Charlie Adam is a fantasy team gem. Even though Blackpool aren't as likely to score as some other teams, Adam's share of every goal is so high that it cancels that out.
The new team put Adam in for Nolan and DJ Campbell in for Zigic. It also picked Seamus Coleman. However, I remain worried that he will not be available for tomorrow's match. (He is currently recovering from injury.)
Once I listed him as still injured, a different formation gave the best results. In particular, I get the following 3-5-2:
- Forwards: R. van Persie (ARS), W. Rooney (MAU),
- Midfielders: F. Lampard (CHE), Nani (MAU), C. Adam (BPL), A. Young (AST), T. Cleverley (WIG)
- Defenders: J. Terry (CHE), L. Baines (EVE), K. Richardson (SUN)
- Keeper: S. Mignolet (SUN)
Tuesday, April 5, 2011
Hodgson, Dalglish, and Statistics
Of all the poor statistical arguments you hear people make, the one that bothers me the most (at the moment, anyway) is when they try to extrapolate recent performance back over the whole season.
If Arsenal beats Wigan 3-0, they say, "if Arsenal had played like this all season, they'd be top of the league," but perhaps they should really say, "if Arsenal had played against Wigan for every match this season, they'd be top of the league." It's not sensible to extrapolate recent performance over the whole season without taking into account who the opponents have been, at the very least.
This error was being made repeatedly a few weeks ago amongst Liverpool fans. They said, "if we'd had Dalglish all season, we'd be top of the league". They would point out that Dalglish's team had earned X points in Y matches, so they suggested that a whole season with Dalglish would have earned (X/Y)*31 points. Argh!
Despite these complaints, it is possible to do a proper analysis of this sort of situation. In fact, I had already reported on what such an analysis shows in this case: no statistical difference with Dalglish versus Hodgson.
Liverpool fans didn't want to hear it, but events since have bourn out that analysis. Liverpool have had a series of poor results. Now fans are admitting that the team just isn't good enough and that they need 4 or 5 new players this summer. This is especially amusing given that Hodgson said exactly this a few months ago and the fans chastised him for it. A better coach, they said, could win the league with this team. Apparently, they've changed their minds about that.
This week, the same statistical error is being made again, but this time by West Brom fans. After West Brom's 2-1 win over Liverpool, pundits are saying that a West Brom with Hodgson would be in the top 5 of the league!
I felt duty bound to do the proper statistical analysis. Here are the results. Unlike with Dalglish, there is currently a nontrivial difference. West Brom are scoring about 0.18 more goals on average (at home only, not away) and conceding 0.26 more goals on average. Unfortunately, these results are more sensitive to how regularization is performed, but the qualitative results are not: Hodgson has made the team stronger in attack and weaker in defense.
Given that, it is hard to imagine that West Brom would be amongst the top 5 in the league. In fact, it's not hard to guess where West Brom would be because there is another team whose characteristics are almost identical to West Brom under Hodgson: Blackpool. The two teams have roughly identical attacking and defending scores as well as the same home versus away performance. So it seems safe to say that, if West Brom had hired Hodgson at the start of the season, they would still be embroiled in a relegation battle now.
If Arsenal beats Wigan 3-0, they say, "if Arsenal had played like this all season, they'd be top of the league," but perhaps they should really say, "if Arsenal had played against Wigan for every match this season, they'd be top of the league." It's not sensible to extrapolate recent performance over the whole season without taking into account who the opponents have been, at the very least.
This error was being made repeatedly a few weeks ago amongst Liverpool fans. They said, "if we'd had Dalglish all season, we'd be top of the league". They would point out that Dalglish's team had earned X points in Y matches, so they suggested that a whole season with Dalglish would have earned (X/Y)*31 points. Argh!
Despite these complaints, it is possible to do a proper analysis of this sort of situation. In fact, I had already reported on what such an analysis shows in this case: no statistical difference with Dalglish versus Hodgson.
Liverpool fans didn't want to hear it, but events since have bourn out that analysis. Liverpool have had a series of poor results. Now fans are admitting that the team just isn't good enough and that they need 4 or 5 new players this summer. This is especially amusing given that Hodgson said exactly this a few months ago and the fans chastised him for it. A better coach, they said, could win the league with this team. Apparently, they've changed their minds about that.
This week, the same statistical error is being made again, but this time by West Brom fans. After West Brom's 2-1 win over Liverpool, pundits are saying that a West Brom with Hodgson would be in the top 5 of the league!
I felt duty bound to do the proper statistical analysis. Here are the results. Unlike with Dalglish, there is currently a nontrivial difference. West Brom are scoring about 0.18 more goals on average (at home only, not away) and conceding 0.26 more goals on average. Unfortunately, these results are more sensitive to how regularization is performed, but the qualitative results are not: Hodgson has made the team stronger in attack and weaker in defense.
Given that, it is hard to imagine that West Brom would be amongst the top 5 in the league. In fact, it's not hard to guess where West Brom would be because there is another team whose characteristics are almost identical to West Brom under Hodgson: Blackpool. The two teams have roughly identical attacking and defending scores as well as the same home versus away performance. So it seems safe to say that, if West Brom had hired Hodgson at the start of the season, they would still be embroiled in a relegation battle now.
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