Another weekend of football comes with another set of questionable penalty decisions. In this post, I'd like to focus on two in particular: (1) the penalty awarded to Man City's Adam Johnson and (2) the penalty awarded to Man United's Danny Welbeck.
Much talk about the rightness or wrongness of these penalties is confused because there are many different questions we can ask. We can question the actions of the attacker or the decision of the referee or even the rules of the game themselves. There are many different questions we can ask, which have different answers. Here, I'll give my opinion on all of the questions I can see.
Was the attacker's action "wrong" (unsportsmanlike)? Yes, in both cases.
Both players went out of their way to make contact rather than trying to play the ball.
In Johnson's case, he kicked out his leg behind him hoping it would make contact with the defender, which it did. He took this action consciously, hoping for a penalty, rather than trying to play the ball. He clearly could have simply continued forward, going after the ball.
In Welbeck's case, rather than running toward the ball, he ran into the defender. The defender was not attempting to impede him. He purposefully decided to run into the defender and trip over him, while he clearly could have gone after the ball instead.
As a fan, I prefer it when players try to stay up even when there is contact. I prefer it when they try to avoid contact by running around or jumping over a leg that gets in their way. In short, I prefer players who act like Leo Messi. Unfortunately, Messi is a rarity in today's game in this aspect just as much as he is in terms of scoring and creating goals.
Was the attacker diving? No, in both cases.
Neither player "dived" in the sense that neither player simulated contact. Both players fell over because of real contact with the defender.
Was the attacker cheating? No, in both cases.
Neither attacker did anything that was against the rules or attempted to subvert the rules. As far as I'm aware, the rules do not award a yellow card for allowing yourself to be tripped.
Was the penalty decision correct? Johnson: questionable. Welbeck: more questionable.
I should first say: I am not a referee. Yes, I have read the laws of the game, but I have not spent hours studying them like religious texts, nor have I carefully read all of the guidance given to referees.
In real terms, however, both instances were of the type that you've seen sometimes given and other times not given.
If one wants to draw a distinction between the two cases, there is this: the defender in Johnson's case had stuck a leg out. In Welbeck's case, the defender (Ivanovic) had both feet firmly planted. While I wouldn't have had a complaint if Johnson's penalty had not been given, Welbeck's feels bad because it's hard to imagine what Ivanovic could have done differently. He defended well, went for the ball cleanly, and even appeared to be trying to stop himself from getting into the path of Welbeck. At the point of contact, he was not even in the path between where Welbeck was and the ball. (He was in the path of Welbeck's motion, but since the ball had moved away, Welbeck could have and should have turned as well.)
Should penalties be given in these situations? No, in both cases.
As I said above, I wish more players acted like Leo Messi, jumping over defender's legs and running around them instead of falling over at any contact. Unfortunately, the rules make this a bad decision for most players. Unlike Messi, most players are more likely to create a goal scoring opportunity by falling over than they are by continuing to play.
This needs to change. One idea is to allow referees to award yellow cards in situations like those of Johnson and Welbeck, where the player did not "dive" but did "go looking for it", trying to get contact with a defender instead of trying to play the ball. If such decisions could be made correctly, the game would be better for it.
That said, if the last few weeks are any evidence, the current laws already ask too much of the referees. So perhaps these changes would just give them more calls to get wrong....
Sunday, February 5, 2012
Saturday, December 3, 2011
Nasri and Silva
In today's match between Manchester City and Norwich City, one aspect that caught my attention was the influence of Samir Nasri. For only the third time this season, Nasri completed more passes than David Silva in a match when both started. One of those was the very first match that Nasri played for City in the league. Since then, Silva has been the dominant creative influence for City in every match save one, when Silva was man-marked for most of the match against Everton.
In Nasri's first four matches, both he and Silva played all over the midfield, in some sense playing the same position. Against Spurs, this seemed to work well, with both players completing over 60 passes. Against Wigan, though, it did not seem to work, as Nasri had little influence, completing half as many passes. It worked a bit better against Fulham, but over all of those four matches, the record is not great.
Starting with the match at Blackburn, the tactics changed somewhat: Nasri played more out wide. He was mostly left against Blackburn and Liverpool, and mostly right against Wolves and United, but all the while, he was playing mostly to one side or the other
Over that same period, there were three matches (Aston Villa, QPR, and Newcastle) in which only one of the two started.
At the end of this period, I had the impression that the two did not play especially well together. If anything, it seemed as though Milner playing in a wide role was able to link up better with Silva.
However, today's match showed yet another approach. Nasri played centrally, rather than wide, but unlike those early matches, he played slightly deeper than Silva. These Guardian chalkboard shows the subtle difference in their passing:
In Nasri's first four matches, both he and Silva played all over the midfield, in some sense playing the same position. Against Spurs, this seemed to work well, with both players completing over 60 passes. Against Wigan, though, it did not seem to work, as Nasri had little influence, completing half as many passes. It worked a bit better against Fulham, but over all of those four matches, the record is not great.
Starting with the match at Blackburn, the tactics changed somewhat: Nasri played more out wide. He was mostly left against Blackburn and Liverpool, and mostly right against Wolves and United, but all the while, he was playing mostly to one side or the other
Over that same period, there were three matches (Aston Villa, QPR, and Newcastle) in which only one of the two started.
At the end of this period, I had the impression that the two did not play especially well together. If anything, it seemed as though Milner playing in a wide role was able to link up better with Silva.
However, today's match showed yet another approach. Nasri played centrally, rather than wide, but unlike those early matches, he played slightly deeper than Silva. These Guardian chalkboard shows the subtle difference in their passing:
Monday, November 28, 2011
Cheaty Divers
Based on last weekend's match between Liverpool and Man City, one would have to say that Luis Suarez's reputation for diving is well deserved. He appears to hit the ground in response to any attempted tackle by opponents, successful or not. At one point, during this match, he actually went studs up into the defender (Vincent Kompany) and then fell on the ground as if he had been fouled!
The individual efforts of Suarez probably explain much of the difference in fouls received in the match (11 v 15). However, there were other notable refereeing decisions that went Liverpools way. In particular, goalkeeper Reina not receiving a card for deliberately handling outside his penalty box and Mario Balotelli's second yellow card. A few in the media have agreed with the latter decision; however, on average, those in the media have suggested it was harsh. All together, there were plenty of reasons for Man City fans to feel aggrieved.
That said, it seems unlikely that any of this, aside from Reina receiving a card, would have changed the outcome of the match. However, deliberate attempts to draw cards either by diving (Suarez) or surrounding the referee (the rest of the Liverpool squad) is not what any fan wants to see. As Roberto Mancini said after the match, "this is not football."
I was left wondering whether this was a one-off for Liverpool or rather a general strategy. In other words, is diving and surrounding the referee now part of the Liverpool way?
To try to understand this, I analyzed fouls in matches using the same technique as I would model goals. Each team gets an "attack" score, which measures how much they foul, and a "defense" score, which measures how much they draw fouls for the other team.*
What do the statistics tell us then?
Broadly, they show that most teams foul at about the same rate. There are a few teams that foul less than usual: Swansea, Norwich, and Man United. Swansea, in particular, foul very little, while the other two foul only a tiny bit less than usual. At the other end, Blackburn and Wigan foul a bit more than usual.
That describes how much each team fouls. The more interesting part is how much each team draws fouls from their opponent.
First off, the statistics do not show that Liverpool are cheaty divers. While they may have displayed some unsporting behavior in this match versus Man City, the model does not suggest they draw fouls any more than other teams in general.
However, some teams do appear to draw fouls. Chelsea, Wolves, and Newcastle draw a few. But the leader in this department, by a huge margin, are Queen's Park Rangers. The amount of fouls they draw is about the same as the difference in fouls between Swansea and an average team, which is quite big. In other words, when Swansea plays against QPR, we would expect them to receive as many fouls as an average team. An average team, on the other hand, should receive quite a few more fouls than usual when playing against QPR.
There is one more possibility afforded by the model, which we have not yet discussed. It's possible for a team not to draw fouls from their opponent but somehow to suppress them. In other words, are there teams whose opponents systematically receive fewer fouls than they should?
It turns out this does indeed happen to one team: Man City. Somehow, when teams play Man City, either they choose not to foul as much as usual or the referee chooses not to call them as often as usual. Furthermore, the effect is not small. It's the third largest effect in the model after Swansea's not fouling and QPR's drawing fouls.
So are teams especially timid when playing against Man City or are the referees biased against them? I'll leave that to you to decide.
(*) As usual, I "regularized" my model, which means I only allowed new variables if the improvement in fit outweighs the extra complexity they add to the model. I.e., Occam's razor was applied.
The individual efforts of Suarez probably explain much of the difference in fouls received in the match (11 v 15). However, there were other notable refereeing decisions that went Liverpools way. In particular, goalkeeper Reina not receiving a card for deliberately handling outside his penalty box and Mario Balotelli's second yellow card. A few in the media have agreed with the latter decision; however, on average, those in the media have suggested it was harsh. All together, there were plenty of reasons for Man City fans to feel aggrieved.
That said, it seems unlikely that any of this, aside from Reina receiving a card, would have changed the outcome of the match. However, deliberate attempts to draw cards either by diving (Suarez) or surrounding the referee (the rest of the Liverpool squad) is not what any fan wants to see. As Roberto Mancini said after the match, "this is not football."
I was left wondering whether this was a one-off for Liverpool or rather a general strategy. In other words, is diving and surrounding the referee now part of the Liverpool way?
To try to understand this, I analyzed fouls in matches using the same technique as I would model goals. Each team gets an "attack" score, which measures how much they foul, and a "defense" score, which measures how much they draw fouls for the other team.*
What do the statistics tell us then?
Broadly, they show that most teams foul at about the same rate. There are a few teams that foul less than usual: Swansea, Norwich, and Man United. Swansea, in particular, foul very little, while the other two foul only a tiny bit less than usual. At the other end, Blackburn and Wigan foul a bit more than usual.
That describes how much each team fouls. The more interesting part is how much each team draws fouls from their opponent.
First off, the statistics do not show that Liverpool are cheaty divers. While they may have displayed some unsporting behavior in this match versus Man City, the model does not suggest they draw fouls any more than other teams in general.
However, some teams do appear to draw fouls. Chelsea, Wolves, and Newcastle draw a few. But the leader in this department, by a huge margin, are Queen's Park Rangers. The amount of fouls they draw is about the same as the difference in fouls between Swansea and an average team, which is quite big. In other words, when Swansea plays against QPR, we would expect them to receive as many fouls as an average team. An average team, on the other hand, should receive quite a few more fouls than usual when playing against QPR.
There is one more possibility afforded by the model, which we have not yet discussed. It's possible for a team not to draw fouls from their opponent but somehow to suppress them. In other words, are there teams whose opponents systematically receive fewer fouls than they should?
It turns out this does indeed happen to one team: Man City. Somehow, when teams play Man City, either they choose not to foul as much as usual or the referee chooses not to call them as often as usual. Furthermore, the effect is not small. It's the third largest effect in the model after Swansea's not fouling and QPR's drawing fouls.
So are teams especially timid when playing against Man City or are the referees biased against them? I'll leave that to you to decide.
(*) As usual, I "regularized" my model, which means I only allowed new variables if the improvement in fit outweighs the extra complexity they add to the model. I.e., Occam's razor was applied.
Wednesday, November 23, 2011
4-4-2 versus 4-2-3-1
We have previously discussed on the fact that no top team plays a traditional 4-4-2 today and that the current version of the 4-4-2 played by, say Manchester United, is not especially different from a 4-2-3-1. Zonal Marking, in his review of Napoli v Man City, strikes the same note:
Of course, when you play with two attack-minded wide players plus one striker dropping off into the hole, 4-4-2 and 4-2-3-1 are, if not interchangeable, not significantly different.
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
Beware of Hindsight Bias
The book "Future Babble", which I'm just finishing at the moment, mentions a new type of cognitive bias that I had not heard of before: hindsight bias. This can be seen, for example, when fans say after a match that the outcome was inevitable, say, as a result of the tactics used by the manager or his player choices.
The bias is not simply that people become more convinced after-the-fact that this outcome was always going to occur. People actually become more convinced that they knew beforehand that this was going to happen. Numerous experiments, comparing people's memories of their certainty with recordings made before the event, have shown this effect to be quite strong.
Further experiments showed that typical post-match analysis actually makes this bias worse. Two psychologists from Northwestern University studied fans at American college football matches and asked some of them to analyze the match in certain ways. (Their paper is called "Perceptions of Purple: Counterfactual and Hindsight Judgments at Northwestern Wildcats Football Games" in case you want to look it up.)
Before the match, fans gave what would be the actual outcome of the match a less than 15% chance of occurring. After the match, fans recalled their own predictions were of a 30% chance of occuring. Amazingly, fans who were asked to analyze the match — in terms of what could have been done differently or what caused the result — recalled their own predictions were higher than 50%!
Clearly, most fans who think about football as much as we do are doing exactly the sort of analysis performed in the experiment. Hence, we are quite likely to fall victim to hindsight bias.
In my mind, this highlights once again the importance of looking at football statistics. Of course, statistics can't eliminate hindsight bias, but they can do two things.
First, they can suggest that some inevitability arguments are implausible. For example, a claim that the team lost because one player started in place of another would seem suspect if statistics show the one who played created just as many chances, had just as many successful tackles, etc. as would have been predicted for the other player.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, statistics can remind you that football involves a lot more chance than most people are willing to admit.
The bias is not simply that people become more convinced after-the-fact that this outcome was always going to occur. People actually become more convinced that they knew beforehand that this was going to happen. Numerous experiments, comparing people's memories of their certainty with recordings made before the event, have shown this effect to be quite strong.
Further experiments showed that typical post-match analysis actually makes this bias worse. Two psychologists from Northwestern University studied fans at American college football matches and asked some of them to analyze the match in certain ways. (Their paper is called "Perceptions of Purple: Counterfactual and Hindsight Judgments at Northwestern Wildcats Football Games" in case you want to look it up.)
Before the match, fans gave what would be the actual outcome of the match a less than 15% chance of occurring. After the match, fans recalled their own predictions were of a 30% chance of occuring. Amazingly, fans who were asked to analyze the match — in terms of what could have been done differently or what caused the result — recalled their own predictions were higher than 50%!
Clearly, most fans who think about football as much as we do are doing exactly the sort of analysis performed in the experiment. Hence, we are quite likely to fall victim to hindsight bias.
In my mind, this highlights once again the importance of looking at football statistics. Of course, statistics can't eliminate hindsight bias, but they can do two things.
First, they can suggest that some inevitability arguments are implausible. For example, a claim that the team lost because one player started in place of another would seem suspect if statistics show the one who played created just as many chances, had just as many successful tackles, etc. as would have been predicted for the other player.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, statistics can remind you that football involves a lot more chance than most people are willing to admit.
Saturday, October 1, 2011
Random Tactical Notes on Manchester City
A couple of random things that I noted during Manchester City's match versus Blackburn Rovers:
- For at least the third time, Kolarov was used as a midfielder.
This intrigues me because of the fact that Gael Clichy seems to be the #1 left fullback at this point in time. Compared to Clichy, Kolarov seems (to me at least) to be more of an attacking threat. He is good at delivering crosses into the box, and as is well known, he likes to take shots from long range. Because of his attacking strength, I wonder whether Mancini imagines a continued role for Kolarov as a left winger.
Why is this a possibility? First, note that many players have switched from winger to fullback or vice versa. For example, Gareth Bale moved up from fullback to be a winger. Second, Manchester City do not have a traditional winger on the left side. Adam Johnson can play this role on the right, but the left position is almost always held by David Silva, who is clearly not a traditional winger. Having the option of real width on the left side may be something that Mancini wants to have in his toolbox. - Nasri has a stronger tendency than Silva to attack the penalty box from wide areas.
Compared to Silva's dazzling work, Nasri's has seemed somewhat lackluster. However, the numbers do not lie: both Nasri and Silva have produced 4 assists this season. Hence, Nasri is clearly contributing a great deal to the team.
In this game, however, I noticed that Nasri's assists were provided while attacking the penalty box from the left wing. Looking back over the previous four matches, this was not out of the ordinary. While Silva has also done this at times, Nasri has shown a stronger tendency to attack from the side.
Like everyone else, I continue to wonder how Nasri and Silva will work together. At least at this point, it seems that Silva spends more time in central positions, looking to pass through the middle, and Nasri spends more time in wide areas, looking to pass from there. Obviously, these two roles are complementary. Is that the division of labor that will continue going forward? It will be interesting to see.
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Holding Midfielders and Fullbacks
The excellent blog, 11tegen11, makes a good point in this post regarding the tradeoffs between holding midfielders and fullbacks by top clubs:
This insight was missed last season, for example, when some compared Man City's use of two holding midfielders to Arsenal's use of one holding without noting the different using of fullbacks (Man City's were more attacking). Looking at holding midfielders in isolation, one would think that Arsenal were the more attacking side, but it's important to consider fullbacks as well. Then it becomes clear that the clubs were using the same number of attacking players in general.
Other teams, as evidenced by the recently published UEFA Champions League technical report, maintain their balance either by covering their defensive line with conservative use of their full backs while playing a single holding midfielder, or by covering their offensive full backs by deploying two conservative holding midfielders.
This insight was missed last season, for example, when some compared Man City's use of two holding midfielders to Arsenal's use of one holding without noting the different using of fullbacks (Man City's were more attacking). Looking at holding midfielders in isolation, one would think that Arsenal were the more attacking side, but it's important to consider fullbacks as well. Then it becomes clear that the clubs were using the same number of attacking players in general.
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